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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Econometric models have long been considered as potential tools for the evaluation 
and selection of policy strategies. As a simulation of an economy, an economic model can 
be used to conduct various policy e;q)eriments. In other words, a policy-oriented 
econometric model is potentially useful to generate quantitative forecasts and to evaluate the 
effects of alternative policies. An econometric model is also useful for economic analysts to 
sharpen their judgments on the effects of various events in the economy. 
The main short-run problems faced by the economic authorities in a developing 
country such as Indonesia is price stabilization, balance of payments equilibrium, and output 
growth. The balance of payments (BOP) is very crucial in an economy so widely open as 
Indonesia, where international trade is very substantial and where there is a completely free 
foreign exchange market and capital flows. Short-run economic stabilization became even 
more important after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in the early 1970s. The 
instability of major currency exchange rates has led to domestic price and balance of 
payments instabili .^ The balance of payments instability, further, has undermined the 
ability of the central bank to control the money supply. As will be discussed in Chapter m, 
money supply is directly related to BOP. Accordingly, monetary policies should be analyzed 
within an open economy framework. 
Discretionary policies available to the government in dealing with short-run economic 
stabilization problems include monetary, fîscal and price policies. This study concentrates 
on monetary policies only. A policy oriented monetary sector model should be useful for 
analyzing these policies. 
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Statement of the Problem 
There have been many macroeconomic models constructed for the Lidonesian 
economy (ECAFE, 1964,1967; Onishi, 1964; Fukuchi, 1968; Gupta, 1977; Boediono, 
1979; Aghevli, 1977; Schydlowsky, 1980; Nasution, 1982; Pamungkas, 1984). The 
Aghevli, Schydlowsky, and Nasution models are monetary-sector oriented, whereas the rest 
are general economic models. As will be discussed in the next section, the monetary sector 
in those models, however, is not detailed enough to capture the institutional setting typical to 
a developing economy such as Indonesia. Of importance is the failure of those models to 
incorporate the supply-side linkage of the monetary sector via working capital or capital 
formation. 
In an economy where a capital market is virtually non-existent, the source of external 
financing for business activities is practically limited to bank loans. Bank loans, therefore, 
are crucial for investment (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Wijnbergen, 1982). The bank 
loan-investment channel may well be the most direct way for monetary policies to affect the 
real sector of the economy. None of the previous models consider the relationship between 
bank loans and investment For those models, if monetary policies matter at aU, it must be 
through the demand side, either through a reduced form aggregate demand or price 
equations. 
The fact that money supply is directly related to the balance of payments makes it 
necessary to include external trade in a more comprehensive monetary sector model. At the 
least, major components such as merchandise imports and exports and private capital flows 
should be endogenized. Private capital flows become increasingly important, especially after 
the introduction of dollar deposits by Indonesian banks. Capital flows fluctuate heavily 
since there are no foreign exchange restrictions. Private capital flows, however, are 
uniformly assumed endogenous in all previous models. This, of course, may affect the 
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vafidily of the models, since private capital flows are directly dependent on both domestic 
and intonational economic situations. 
Another important component of the monetary sector that has been neglected in 
previous models is the sterilization of the balance of payments. Sterilization is an attempt to 
reduce the effect of the BOP on themoney supply by reciprocally changing domestic credit 
Some studies have shown that the Indonesian central bank indeed sterilizes the BOP (Amdt, 
1979; Djiwandono, 1980; Amdt and Sundrum, 1984). This sterilization is conducted by 
increasing government deposits at the central bank. 
This study is an attempt to construct a policy-oriented model for Indonesia. The 
model will be designed to capture the bank loan-investment nexus, which may be the more 
direct channel for monetary policies to affect real variables. The price channel through the 
excess demand for money will also be taken into account Private capital flows will be 
endogenized along with trade in services. In addition, sterilization of the BOP will be 
captured too. The model will be used to analyze some policy experiments such as changing 
the exchange rate and central bank lending to commwcial banks. 
Literature Review 
There is an abundant literature related to the subject of this study. Tills review will 
be limited to the most important and relevant studies. The review will be divided into two 
sections. The first section will deal with monetary-sector modeling for developing countries. 
This will provide a background for the conceptual framework for the study. Specific 
studies on the Indonesian economy will be discussed in the second section. 
On monetary sector modeling of develoning economy 
Economic models have been widely used as standard tools for policy evaluation and 
economic forecasting in developed countries. The first large scale econometric model was 
4 
constructed by Tinbergen in the late 1930s (Tinbergen, 1939). As usual, this pioneering 
work had to survive strong resistance and skepticism from the established non-quantitative 
economic analysis tradition. Perhaps the most interesting debate was between Tinbergen and 
Keynes (Keynes, 1939; 1940; Tinbergen, 1940). Although Keynes was doubtful of the 
wisdom of using statistical techniques for economic analysis, he nevertheless encouraged 
more research into this new area. 
The first dynamic macroeconomic models were used for testing economic theory and 
for business cycle analysis. The Keynesian revolution on the theory of output and 
employment after World War n shifted the emphasis toward policy prescription and 
forecasting. 
The rapid development of the application of modem statistical inference to economic 
theory between 1940-1950 provided a solid momentum for quantitative economic analysis 
(Hicks, 1939; Haavehno, 1943; Maim and Wald, 1943; Samuelson, 1947; Koopmans, 
1950). The modem era of econometric models received its greatest impetus from the work 
of Klein-Goldberger in the early 1950s (Klein, 1950; Klein and Goldberger, 1955). With 
the availability of refined data bases, and the support of advanced computers, an increasing 
number of large econometric models were constructed, especially in the 1960s (Klein et al., 
1961; liebenberg et al., 1966; Evans and Klein, 1967; De Leeuw and Gramlich, 1968; 
Duensenberry et al., 1965). 
Following the trend in the developed countries, interest in the economic modeling of 
developing countries began in the 1960s. As with the first introduction of econometrics in 
developed economies, there were early debates as to whether the econometric modeling of 
developing economies was worthwhile (Vernon, 1966; Conrad, 1968). Vernon argued that 
the multivalent nature of national objectives, the absence of reliable data, and the high 
opportunity cost of skilled labor would make econometric modeling not worthwhile. 
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However, he did not reject the potential usefulness of econometric models for policy analysis 
in the future. Conrad, on the otiier hand, thought that Vernon was unnecessarily pessimistic 
and impatient Conrad pointed out that econometric models need not pretend to specify 
unambiguously national objective functions. Rather, fliey offer the possibilily of trade-offs 
among objectives that must somehow be reconciled. He gave specific, real field-examples of 
how econometric modeling provided useful and worthwhile policy recommendations in 
Pakistan and Argentina. With regard to the data base and skilled labor, he argued that these 
are basically a matter of time. Continuing and coordinated international efforts through the 
United Nations and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should help eliminate the data 
problem. 
Perhaps one of the most important roles of econometric modeling for developing 
countries is that it provides an accumulation of knowledge and interest for more rational 
economic planning and policies. The widespread acceptance of the usefulness of some form 
of systematic economic analysis as a basis for government policies in recent years is very 
encouraging (Chenery, 1975). Economic decision makers are also increasingly drawn from 
professionals with sufficient education and ability to conceptualize problems. This core of 
economic leadership should be more receptive toward the use of econometrics for policy 
analysis. 
A large number of economic models have been constructed for less developed 
countries. The theoretical foundation for the earlier models had been the Harrod-Domar 
aggregate growth model, static and dynamic programming, the Chenery two-gap analysis, 
and Lewis-Fei-Ranis labor surplus model (Harrod, 1939; Domar, 1946; Chenery and S trout, 
1966; Eckaus and Parikh, 1968; Adelman and Thorbecke, 1966; ECAFE, 1967; UNTACD, 
1968; Fei and Ranis, 1964; Agarwala, 1970). All of these models considered only real 
variables. The models are designed to analyze constraints to achieve high economic growth. 
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Production functions are characterized by some rigid input-output coefficients. Prices are 
usually neglected. The entire fiscal-monetary-income-balance of payments nexus is ignored. 
These models, therefore, are not suitable for short-run price, income, and balance of 
payments stabilization analysis. 
In the shortrun, the real problem faced by the economic leadership of developing 
countries is stabilization of prices, income, and balance of payments. Consequently, the 
second generation econometric models for developing countries have emerged to analyze 
economic stabilization problems. The theoretical foundations of these models are either 
Keynesian, monetarist, or a synthesis of the two. The Keynesian model emphasizes 
aggregate demand, and is characterized by its detailed elaboration of the aggregate 
expenditure identity for income determination (Manvah, 1969; Evans, 1970; Encamacion et 
aL, 1972). The monetarist model, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of monetary 
aggregates (Otani and Park, 1976), aggregate income is usually determined through a 
reduced-form equation that is a function of the money stock. The price level is a monetary 
phenomenon and inflation, therefore, is mainly determined by money supply growth or 
excess money supply. 
Keynesian and monetarist models were originally designed for developed countries, 
where capital markets are well-developed. Monetary saving and investment, consequently, 
are two distinct processes. Bank loans are not the only sources of external finance for firms. 
Firms can also generate funds by selling equity or promissory notes. Moreover, these 
countries have a very strong productive industrial complex that is capable of producing much 
more output than it actually does. Their main problem, therefore, is to find enough effective 
demand to absorb this output Econometric models that emphasize the aggregate demand 
side should be appropriate for these countries (Klein, 1965). 
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Less-developed countries, however, aie commonly characterized by a very thin 
capital market, a low capital endowment, an infant industrial base, and a high dependence on 
extranal capital and essential inputs. All ofthese limit productive capacity. The relatively 
large population size creates enormous demand pressures. Clearly, less developed countries 
face supply-side much more than demand-side constraints. A more appropriate econometric 
model for developing countries, therefore, should be one which emphasizes the supply side 
for aggregate income determination (Klein, 1965,1971; Behrman, 1971,1977). 
The supply-side emphasizing model is even more compelling in modeling the 
monetary sector of developing economies. In an economy where equity and commercial 
paper markets are practically non-existent, the main source of external finance for business 
activities is bank loans. Bank loans are very important for fixed and working capital 
financing (McKinnon, 1973; Kapur, 1976; Kumar, 1983; BufRe, 1984; Wijnbergen, 
1983a,b). Consumption loans are virtually absent due to government restrictions. The bank 
loans-investment nexus is one of the important channels through which monetary policies 
affect real variables. This may be the reason why monetary policies in less developed 
countries are transmitted to the real sector faster than in developed countries (Park, 1973). 
Another important aspect of monetary-sector modeling is the interrelationship 
between the balance of payments and money supply. As will be shown Chapter DI, the 
BOP is directly related to the monetary base, and hence to the money supply. In a wide-
open economy like Indonesia, the BOP could fluctuate so much that it threatens domestic 
economic stability. The central bank may reduce the effect of the BOP on the money supply 
by reciprocally changing domestic credit. This is called sterilization (Argy and Kouri, 1974; 
Cumby and Obstfeld, 1983). Sterilization, however, cannot be done indefinitely in a 
country with a continuous BOP deficit or surplus. In particular, sterilization is not feasible if 
domestic and foreign currencies are perfect substitutes (De Grauwe, 1983). 
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Sterilization has important implications for monetary policy modeling. The domestic 
credit used for sterilization will depend on the BOP. This relationship may be represented by 
a policy reaction function (Argy and Kouri, 1974, Cumby and Obstfeld, 1983; Ujie, 1978). 
On modeling the Indonesian monetary sector 
The first known macroeconomic models of the Indonesian economy are the ECAFE 
MODEL NO. I (ECAFE, 1964) and the Onishi Model (Onishi, 1964). These two models 
use the same theoretical foundation, which is the "gap" model with the Harrod-Domar fixed 
capital-output ratio in the aggregate production function. The models concentrate on the 
international trade gap only. Domestic saving, money, and prices are not considered. The 
models are used for the forecasting of the aggregate production growth rate either with 
imports only (Onishi), or with both imports and exports as its main constraints. Obviously, 
the models are not designed for policy analysis. The models are too simple for representing 
an economy realistically. 
To improve its first model the ECAFE constructed ECAFE MODEL NO. H, which is 
much more detailed than the previous one ^ CAFE, 1967). This model is designed to 
simulate the Indonesian economy in the 1960s, which was characterized by economic 
stagnation and accelerating inftadon. 
The major improvements in the ECAFE MODEL NO. EE are the introduction of prices 
and money. Following the pure monetarist hypothesis, inflation is assumed a monetary 
phenomenon. The price level is assumed a function of the money-income ratio. The money 
supply, on the other hand, is a linear function of the government budget deficit. Th^s money 
supply determination, however, may be mispecified. It is the change in the money supply 
(flow), not its level (stock), that should be diiectiy related to the government deficit (flow). 
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The balance of payments and monetary system loans to the private sector are not considered 
in this model. 
Following ECAFE MODEL NO. H, Fukuchi developed two versions of econometric 
models for the Indonesia, ICU MODEL NO. I and ICU MODEL NO. II (Fukuchi, 1968). 
The two models are basically the same except that ICU MODEL NO. n is more 
disaggregated and that the foreign exchange reserve is endogenized. Their structures are 
similar to the ECAFE MODEL NO. IL The only modifications in these models are 
disaggregation of investment by industries and a revision of the money supply as a function 
of the accumulated government budget deficit 
After a decade of stagnation, the economic modeling of the Indonesian economy 
started again in the late 1970s (Gupta, 1977; Aghevli, 1977; Boediono, 1979; Schydlowslqr, 
1980; Nasution, 1982; Pamungkas, 1984). The Gupta and Pamungkas models are based on 
the same theoretical framework. Both are designed to analyze interrelationships among 
economic growth and equity, employment, and poverty. Production function are assumed to 
follow a Harrod-Domar incremental capital-output ratio. Investment is constrained by 
resource availability, and domestic and foreign savings, in the spirit of the two-gap model. 
Many of the key parameters and variables are assumed values, not derived from actual data. 
The monetary sector is barely considered. The only role of money is for price determination. 
The most interesting aspect of the Gupta-Pamungkas models is their integration of equity, 
employment, poverty, and economic growth. The reliability of their conclusions, however, 
are heavily dependent on the accuracy of their subjective assumptions on various parameters 
and variables. 
The Boediono model may be the most consistent and elaborate of all large-scale 
econometric models of Indonesian economy. This model consists of two parts, macro and 
micro. The macro model is of the Keynesian type with an emphasis on aggregate demand 
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components. The micro model consists of 40 industrial sectors. Each sector has supply and 
demand functions. The model is a Walrasian System constructed following the Johansen 
approach (Johansen, 1960; 1974). The macro model can either be solved independently or 
linked to the micro model 
The most interesting part of the Boediono model is its micro model and its linkage 
with the macro model. The link, however, is only partial—that is, only through gross 
national product. Unfortunately, due to data problems, only the parameters for the demand 
functions are directly estimated. All other parameters are determined subjectively or 
borrowed from other studies. 
The monetary sector of the macro model is relatively simple. There is no demand 
function for money. Money supply is determined using the multiplier approach. Divestment 
and capital flows are assumed exogenous. There is no consideration of balance of payments 
stenlization. 
The Schydlowsky model is a Keynesian model. All behavioral equations, except the 
tax function, are merely constant ratios of two variables. Tax, on the other hand, is a linear 
function of two variables, aggregate income and imports. Due to data problems all 
parameters are determined subjectively. By exploiting the aggregate income identity the 
system is then solved to obtain various standard Keynesian multipliers. 
The interesting feature of Schydlowsky model is its monetary sector. Even though 
the behavioral relationships are too simple (merely fixed proportions), this model may be the 
most complete in elaborating the monetary sector. The money supply is linked to statutory 
institutions and government deficits, in addition to the BOP. The monetary sector, however, 
is linked to the real sector only through the demand side. That is, credit increases both 
pivate and government expenditures. There is no specific link between bank credit and 
investment The accumulation of financial assets, mainly time and saving deposits, is 
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considered a leakage from income streams and thus reduces aggregate demand. This, of 
course, neglects the role of monetary deposits for bank loan expansion. Another limitation 
of the model is its assumption that domestic prices are directly related to foreign prices 
following the price-unification hypothesis. By assuming foreign prices as given, the 
domestic price level is also given in this model. This, clearly, is unrealistic. 
The Aghevli and Nasution models are monetary-oriented. Both emphasize the 
monetary sector and its interrelationship with the external sector. The Nasution model is 
basically an extension of the Aghevli model. Whereas Aghevli assumes gross national 
product as exogenous, Nasution endogenizes it by adding a reduced form aggregate demand 
function. Aggregate demand is a function of domestic prices, the exchange rate, world 
prices, the interest rate, and time trend. Thus, there is no direct relationship between real 
income and bank credit Bank loans to the private sector are not specifically considered. 
Central bank credit to the private sector, however, is linked to the money supply via the 
monetary base. Sterilization of the BOP is neglected and capital flows are assumed 
exogenous. 
Objectives 
The general objective of this study is to develop a monetary-policy oriented model of 
the Indonesian economy. The model will take into account the role of bank loans for capital 
formation, which is considered to be crucial in an underdeveloped capital market Private 
capital flows and trade in services will be endogenized. The central bank attempt to sterilize 
the BOP effect on money supply will be integrated into the model. These aspects have been 
neglected in all previous models of the Indonesian economy. 
Specifically, the objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. A descriptive survey Indonesian monetary institutions and policies. 
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2. An investigation and modeling of the channels through which monetary policies 
might affect inflation and real variables. In addition to the well-known wealth 
and price channels, the role of bank loans will also be considered. 
3. An investigation and modeling of the balance of payments components, as 
disaggregated as they possibly can be, and their relationships with the money 
supply. 
4. Check the performance of individual behavioral equations and the complete 
integrated model. 
5. Use the model to simulate the effects of exchange rate and central bank credit 
policies. 
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CHAPTER n. DESCRIPTION OF INDONESIAN GENERAL ECONOMIC 
AND MONETARY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 
After the political upheaval of 1965-1966, a new regime, commonly known as the 
New Order, emerged in the leadership of General (later President) Suharto. Prior to that 
time Didonesia was under economic disorder, plagued by hyperinflation and recession. 
Accordingly, as soon as the new government had consolidated its power in March 1966, an 
economic stabilization plan was launched in October 1966. After stabilizing price 
successfully, vigorous general economic development programs have been conducted 
through a series of Five-Year Economic Plans starting ftom April 1969. Financial 
intermediation revived as inflation was brought undo* control and attractive savings 
incentives were offered by the government Many major structural changes have taken place 
since then. The development of some selected key economic variables, such as economic 
growth, government expenditure and finance, money supply, and balance of payments will 
be reviewed in the chapter. Since it will be useful as background for this study, financial 
institutions and policies will also be reviewed. 
General Economic Development 
One of impressive economic achievements of the New Order regime is its success in 
turning the economy from stagnation to one of tiie world's fastest growing economies. 
Between 1970-1974 the economy grew at 8.57 percent per year (Table 1). During this 
period, the highest growth occurred in the mining sector due to the oil boom. Construction 
was high as the result of heavy government projects along with private business and 
industrial development. Trade was also high as business activities were facilitated by the 
rapid economic growth and availability of transportation, communication services, and 
electric power. 
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Table 1. Contributions of each sector to overall growth (%) (Source: McCawley, 1985) 
Sector 1970-74 1975-79 1980-83 Average 
Food 1.02 0.53 1.13 0.87 
Non-food agriculture 0.89 0.51 0.18 0.55 
Mines 1.45 0.48 -0.19 0.63 
Manufacturing 1.22 1.52 1.28 1.34 
Electricity 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.07 
Construction 0.72 0.59 0.54 0.62 
Trade 1.63 1.08 1.25 1.33 
Transport 0.48 0.65 0.43 0.52 
Banks 0.17 0.23 0.22 0.20 
Rent 0.34 0.32 0.21 0.29 
Government 0.51 0.90 0.85 0.75 
Services 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.09 
Total 8.57 6.94 6.06 7.23 
During 1975-1979, the period the economic growth rate fell to 6.94 percent per year, 
primarily as a result of a slow down in oil exports. The agricultural sector growth rate also 
fell, primarily as a result of poor harvest of food crops. The only sector that experienced a 
significant increase in its growth rate was manufacturing, made possible by various factors: 
(1) high domestic demand, especially government spending, made possible by huge 
revenues from the oil boom; (2) a large government investment in the manufacturing sector, 
such as fertilizer, iron and steel, and oil refineries plants; (3) large foreign investment 
attracted by favorable general economic conditions; and (4) technological progress. 
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After a brief increase in 1980-1981, the world oil price began to fall in 1982. To 
keep the price fix>m a dramatic fall, OPEC asked its members to reduce production through a 
quota system. As the result, Indonesian oil exports began falling in 1982. As can be seen 
ficom Table 1, the mining sector growth rate was negative during the 1980-1983 period. 
Along with the reduction in oil exports, overall domestic demand has also fallen since 1982. 
Since Ibidonesian manufacturing has a narrow export base (Hill, 1984), the domestic demand 
slow down has led to recession in the manufacturing sector. The non-food agricultural 
sector growth rate also fell substantially. The only sector that gained a significant increase in 
its growth rate was the food sector. This was primarily due to a good rice harvest. Overall 
economic growth during the 1980-1983 period was still quite high at 6.01 percent per year. 
Without doubt, oil has been very important for the economy, not only as a major 
component of the gross domestic product, but also as the major source of government 
revenue and foreign exchange. The recent post oil boom, nevertheless, indicates that the 
economy still can achieve a high economic growth rate during an oil recession. The 
manufacturing, construction, trade and transportation sectors have become increasingly 
important 
The high economic growth rate, however, has not been accompanied by a 
satisfactory employment absorption. During the 1971-1980 period, total employment only 
grew at 2.9 percent per year (Table 2), whereas total output of the economy grew at 7.7 
percent per year. The most disappointing sector is manufacturing. Employment absorption 
in manufacturing only grew at 4.1 percent per year, whereas its real output grew at 12.8 
percent per year. The rate of growth of employment in manufacturing was the lowest among 
all sectors except agriculture. One possible reason for the low employment absorption of the 
manufacturing sector is that the development strategy for the sector has been import-
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substitution oriented. Import-substitution industries tend to be highly capital intensive and 
have a narrow domestic resource base. 
Table 2. Employment by sector, 1971-80 (Source: Scherer, 1982) 
Sectors 1971 
Number Share 
(lOCX) persons) (%) 
1980 
Number 
(1000 persons) 
Is Annual Growth 1971-80 (%) 
Agriculture 24963.9 65.9 28040.4 55.5 1.0 
Mining 90.6 0.2 369.4 0.7 16.5 
Manufacturing 2949.6 7.8 4360.7 8.6 4.1 
Utilities 38.1 0.1 84.6 0.2 8.9 
Construction 740.6 2.0 1573.1 3.1 8.4 
Transport and 
Communication 919.2 2.4 1467.8 2.9 5.0 . 
Trade 4143.8 10.9 6611.4 12.1 5.0 
Banking 95.5 0.3 232.5 0.5 10.1 
Services 3939.7 10.4 7739.3 15.4 7.5 
Other 1603.6» 712.8» — — 
Total 39474.5 100.0 51191.5 100.0 2.9 
^Other is distributed proportionally among other sectors. 
Another disappointing aspect of recent economic development is income inequality. 
The gap between the rich and the poor is increasing, especially in urban Java where most of 
modem development takes place (Hughes and Islam, 1981). 
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In addition to economic growth, another remarkable achievement of the New Order 
regime is its ability to control inflation. Indonesia experienced a severe hyperinflation in 
1960s (Table 3). In 1966, when the regime took power, inflation was 986 percent per 
annum. As can be seen from Table 3, the inflation rate is closely associated with the money-
supply growth rate. In the period 1961-1966 the inflation rate was even higher than the 
money-supply growth rate. This may indicate that the public had lost trust in the abili  ^of 
the government to control inflation. 
Excessive money-supply growth in 1961-1966 was due to huge government deficits. 
Large and increasing government expenditures were needed to finance the restoration of 
order after disturbances caused by regional rebellions, confrontation with Malaysia, and 
extensive uneconomical "special projects." Suffîcient government revenue, on the other 
hand, could not be generated due to overall economic stagnation, export reduction, and high 
inflation. The result was huge budget deficits. Since government bonds did not exist, aU 
budget deficit had to be financed through direct borrowings from the central bank. The 
money supply was directly related to budgetary deficits. 
The situation became increasingly worse as the tax collection system broke down due to the 
hyperinfiation. Accelerated inflation induced taxpayers to avoid or delay paying taxes. 
Inflation, in combination with foreign exchange shortages and controls, led to black market 
exchange rate and trade smuggling. Since trade taxes were the major sources of government 
revenue, smuggling also worsened the budget deficit problem. Government expenditures 
also increased with inflation. In essence, the economy was trapped in a hyperinflationary 
cycle. Deficit created inflation which further increased the deficit and inflation. An excellent 
Table 3. Inflation, money-supply growth, and sources of changes of the money supply (Sources: 1957-1965, Amdt, 1971; 
1966-1983, Bade Indonesia, Indonesian financial statistics) 
Year Inflation Money Sources of Changes of Money Supply (Million Rp) 
% Supply ^ 1) Credit to Change in Credit to Credit to Other 
Government Foreign Assets Public Enteiprises Private Sector Credit 
1957 54.9 41.0 0.0058 -0.0010 0.0001 0.0022 -0.0015 
1958 18.0 55.6 0.0095 0.0006 0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0001 
1959 13.2 18.7 0.0034 0,014 0.0053 0.0011 -0.0182 
1960 20.0 37.2 -0.0008 0.0045 0.0033 -0.0012 0.0072 
1961 95,2 41.1 0.0234 -0.0068 0.0031 0.0071 -0.0070 
1962 155.9 101.0 0.0536 -0.0094 0.0128 0.0051 0.0061 
1963 128.8 93.8 0.1228 -0.0110 0.0236 0.0100 -0.0179 
1964 135.3 156,3 0.3456 -0.0102 0.0819 0.0324 -0.0380 
1965 592.2 282.5 1.4185 -0.0036 0.3952 0.2374 -0.1406 
1966 985.7 763,5 12.608 -0.256 -0.005 5.972 1.574 
1967 174.8 131.8 24 -12 25 -5 
1968 55.1 121.3 3 13 22 40 -6 
1969 17.0 58.0 -11 4 30 88 -7 
1970 12.3 33.9 -12 16 -3 146 -50 
1071 4.4 28.2 55 11 16 102 -44 
1972 6.5 48.0 -51 212 -3 183 -116 
1973 30.9 41.0 -425 75 67 408 -215 
1974 34.0 40.1 -132 364 295 147 -209 
1975 19.0 33.3 -253 -589 926 298 143 
1976 19.8 28.2 -384 345 450 357 -115 
1977 11.0 25.1 -208 568 35 284 -180 
1978 6.8 24.0 -341 718 900 587 -1187 
1979 21.9 36.1 -741 1654 371 557 -427 
1980 18.5 47.6 -1909 3101 487 1178 -440 
1981 11.8 29.8 -524 238 592 1756 -36 
1982 9.5 9.8 530 -1528 732 2217 -593 
1983 11.8 6.3 -1056 1069 -85 2223 817 
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analysis of the budget deficit-inflation cycle in Indonesia can be found in Aghevli and Khan 
(1977). 
Realizing that the budgetary deficit was the primary cause of inflation, the New Order 
regime launched its economic stabilization program by instituting a budget-discipline policy. 
Government expenditures were controlled by centralizing the government budget and 
abandoning non-economic and special projects. Government expenditures weie closely 
monitored and regularly evaluated. Under stand-by arrangements, the IMF limited 
government expenditures to less than ten percent of the national income. The tax collection 
administration was also improved. Emphasis was placed on increasing custom duty 
collection, direct tax revenues, and excise and sales taxes. With additional help from foreign 
aid, the government has been able to balance its budget since 1968. The balanced-budget 
principle became a political commitment for the government 
De facto, however, the government has systematically maintained a budget surplus. 
The balanced-budget principle only means that in a formal bookkeeping report government 
expenditure equals its revenue. The evidence of budget surplus is hidden with "tactical" 
expenditures such as paying "debtf* to the central bank, creating a special deposit at the 
central bank, and substituting budget expenditures for expenditures normally financed by 
central bank credit Foreign aid is considered as government revenue. As can be seen from 
Table 3, the government has a systematically increasing claim against the banking sector 
since 1969. 
De facto budget-surplus policy is, in part, an effort to sterilize the effect of the 
balance of payments on the money supply (Amdt and Sundrum, 1984; Amdt, 1979). As 
Table 3 shows, the increase in government deposits in the banking system is closely 
associated with the increase in foreign assets of the banking system. By increasing 
Table 4. Balance of payments (Millions SDR) (Source: IMF, Balance of payment statistics) 
1975 
Current Account -913 
Exports 
OU 4174 
Other goods 1499 
Services 113 
Imports 
Goods -4504 
Services -2217 
Unrequited 
transfer 22 
Capital Account 292 
Direct 
investment 392 
CWier private 
capital -1796 
Official capital 
transfer 1696 
Net Error and 
Omissions -85 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
-788 -40 -1136 755 2197 -520 -4830 -5888 
5267 
2195 
139 
6210 
3006 
142 
5879 
2922 
232 
7404 
4314 
308 
12007 
4713 
343 
16082 
3751 
1305 
14366 
3514 
1380 
12824 
4682 
1140 
-5906 
-2496 
-6401 
-3018 
-6695 
-3485 
-7152 
-4141 
-9680 
-5228 
-14082 
-7790 
-16170 
-8040 
-16559 
-8072 
13 
1735 
21 
869 
11 
1193 
23 
625 
42 
935 
212 
2058 
121 
5291 
97 
5771 
298 201 223 175 141 113 205 270 
-159 -194 99 -462 -609 64 1554 1773 
1596 862 871 912 1403 1881 3532 3728 
-158 -47 -107 -312 -1356 -1438 -1920 433 
Total change in 
Reserves -706 789 782 -50 1068 1776 100 -1459 316 
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government deposits at the banking system when a balance of payments surplus occurs, the 
overall change in money supply will be smaller. 
Having been able to control the govermnent budget, the money-supply growth rate 
dropped dramatically fix>m 765.5 percent in 1966 to 131.8 percent in 1967. Inflation also 
dropped dramatically from 985.7 percent in 1966 to 174.8 percent in 1967. Inflation has 
been practically under controlled since 1969. 
Even though the money supply growth rate was relatively very high at between 24.0-
58.0 percent during 1969-1981 period (compared to 3-5 percent proposed by Friedman 
(1968) for developed economies), inflation was relatively low, between 6.5 to 34.0 percent 
during the same period. This apparently less inflationary money phenomenon may be 
explained by the fact that the primary sources of the money supply increase have been credits 
to the private sector and to public enterprises for productive purposes. By directing bank 
credits into productive activities, the economy has been able to tolerate a high money supply 
grwoth rate, since the demand for money would increase due to the increase in production. 
An increase in demand for money due to a reduction in expected inflation may also have 
contributed to this high tolerance for money supply growth. 
Indonesia's balance of payments during the 1975-1983 period is presented in Table 
4. Current account has always been in deficit except in 1979 and 1980 when it was in 
surplus due to sudden jumps in non-oil exports, especially rubber and timber. The balance 
of merchandise trade has always been in surplus, whereas the balance of service trade has 
been in deficit. This is due to huge investment income transfers abroad by foreign oil 
companies. The merchandise export is dominated by oil exports. Oil exports had 
continuously increased until 1981. The oil export then fell due to the decline in world oil 
prices and the export limitation policy of the OPEC cartel. Imports, on the other hand, are 
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continuously increasing. As the result, the current account deficits has been very large since 
1982. 
It is interesting to note that trade in services is increasingly important Naturally, 
imports of services will be increasing with oil exports as oil investment income transfers 
increase. Also of interest is the development of services exports. Export of services was 
more than 1.5 billion U.S. dollars or more than one-third of all non-oil merchandise exports 
in 1981. Unfortunately, the export of services has been overlooked in all studies of the 
Indonesian economy. Most of the exports of services are in the form of investment income 
and travel (tourism) services. 
Capital account has always been in surplus. The biggest component of the capital 
account is net capital inflows of foreign borrowings. Government foreign borrowing was 
excessively high in 1975-1976 since capital was needed to bail out Pertamina (the national oil 
company) debt It has also increased dramatically since 1982 as falling government oil 
revenues and the budget deficit must be financed by foreign borrowings. 
The second biggest component of the capital account is non-direct investment capital 
flow. This mainly consists of portfolio investment The first significant private capital 
inflow occurred in 1972 as the combined result of the liberalization of the foreign exchange 
market, a good outlook for the balance of payments and a high domestic interest rate. A 
large amount of this fund is invested in short term dollar deposits offered by Indonesian 
banks. These deposits are responsive to interest rate differentials and expected devaluation 
(Amdt and Suwidjana, 1982; Boediono, 1985). This may be the explanation of the very 
high fluctuation of non-direct investment private capital flows (Table 4). And this may be 
also why it is imperative to model its behavior in modeling the balance of payments sector. 
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Financial Institutions 
The focus of this study is monetary policy analysis. Accordingly, financial 
institutions discussed here will be limited to those which are important for the conduct of 
monetary policies. For Didonesia, this would include Bank Indonesia as the central bank, 
commercial banks, and non-bank financial institutions. The non-bank financial institutions 
are limited to non-depository and non-insurance companies. The capital and money markets 
will also be discussed, although they may not be important yet, because of their potential in 
the future. 
Bank Indonesia 
Bank Indonesia is the central bank in Lidonesia. Its historical development has been 
very much influenced by its origin. Bank Indonesia was originally a Dutch-owned 
commercial bank. The Bank of Java. The Bank of Java operated as a semi-governmental 
institution during the Dutch colonization era. In addition to commercial activities, it also 
performed some central banking functions. These functions, however, were limited to those 
activities essential for colonial government operations, particularly export related businesses. 
The partial central banking functions included issuing bank notes, advancing funds to the 
Colonial government, and administering gold and foreign exchange. However, it did not 
perform other central banking functions such as controlling credit expansion, holding 
reserves of commercial banks, or serving as a lender of last resort (Emery, 1970), 
Shortly after the Revolutionary War, the New Indonesian government nationalized 
the Bank of Java and changed its name to Bank Indonesia on December 6, 1951. The first 
Central Banking Act was passed in 1953, which outlined the organization and functions of 
the central bank. According to this Act, the management of Bank Indonesia shall consist of a 
Monetary Board, a Managing Board, and an Advisory Board. The Monetary Board 
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formulated general monetary policies, provided the Managing Board with advice on the 
bank's policies in other matters as the public interest required, and fixed interest rates. Bank 
Indonesia, therefore, was merely executing the policies outlined by the Monetary Board. 
The members of the Monetary Board are certain ministers and the Governor of Bank 
hdonesia with the Minister of Finance as acting chairman. The Advisory Board members 
are appointed from the science community to advise the Monetary Board. 
In accordance with the Central Bank Act of 1953, the government (President) issued 
government ordinance No 1 of 1955 that gave Bank Indonesia, in the name of the Monetary 
Board, the right to supervise credit institutions. 
After the New Order regime took power, it pledged to reform the government system 
according to the National Constitution of 1945. It was argued that according to the National 
Constitution, all governmental policies are in the hands of the President Hence, it is the 
President, not the Monetary Board or its kind, that should formulate monetary policies. 
Accordingly, a Presidential decree was issued in 1966 which put the central bank as one of 
the highest non-departmental institutions. With this, the Governor of Bank Indonesia is 
responsible to the President 
A series of banking laws were passed in the 1966-1968 period. Among the 
important provisions are reconfirmation of the role of Bank Indonesia as the central bank and 
supervisor of all commercial banks, and establishment of the Economic Stabilization Council 
which formulates all economic policies. The Economic Stabilization Council is chaired by 
the President The Governor of Bank Indonesia is one of its members. The role of the 
Monetary Board is now limited to advising to the President Its duties are (1) to assist the 
government in planning and formulating monetary policies by proposing policy guidelines to 
Tnaintain monetary stability, increase employment, and increase the welfare of the people, (2) 
to lead and coordinate implementation of monetary policies. The Monetary Board is chaired 
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by the Minister of Finance and its members are the Minister of Trade and Cooperatives, and 
the Governor of Bank Indonesia. 
Li summaiy. Bank Indonesia is not an independent body. It is a part of the 
government agencies. Nonetheless, it performs the common central banking activities which 
include: (1) issuing currency; (2) controlling commercial bank credits; (3) controlling and 
managing the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves; (4) controlling the interest rate 
structure; (5) banker to the government and financial institutions; and (6) supervising 
financial institutions. 
Cgmmmial Banks 
The banking sector in Lidonesia is dominated by state banks. There are five state 
commercial banks, one national development bank and 26 regional development banks, and 
one national savings bank. State commercial bank domination can be seen from their share 
in lending, fund mobilization and assets (Table 5). State commercial banks hold more than 
70 percent of loans, deposits and assets. In the second distant is national private banks, and 
then foreign banks. 
Table 5. Banks share of loans, funds and assets in 1983 (%) (Source: Bank Indonesia, 
Report of the financial year 1982/1983) 
Banks Loans Funds Assets 
State commercial banks^ 74.8 70.7 77.0 
National private banks 11.9 13.2 11.2 
Regional development banks 3.2 3.5 3.2 
Foreign banks 6.5 12.6 8.6 
^Including national development bank. 
Each state bank is governed by a board of supervisors and a board of directors. All 
members of these boards are appointed by the government, and are drawn from government 
employees and the Aimed Forces. The Board of Supervisors holds meetings occasionally to 
discuss major matters such as approving the budget of the bank (Nasution, 1982). 
Government involvement in commercial banking is designed such that it is easier for 
the government to execute its monetary policies in an environment where the money and 
capital markets are virtually inexistent State banks are development agents and not merely 
profit oriented banks. They must carry out government policies. For example, prior to June 
1983, during the financial controlled era, state banks had to charge interest rates on deposits 
and loans as determined by the govemmenL They also had to allocate their loans to 
particular sectors of the economy as indicated by government decisions. In addition, state 
banks function as intermediaries to channel the central bank direct credits to various sectors 
hidden under the name of refinancing facilities. Li return, the state commercial banks have 
enjoyed various government protections and subsidies, such as deposit interest subsidies 
(prior to June, 1983), cheap refinancing facilities, bankers to government agencies, deposit 
guarantees, debt bail out, budget allocation for capital participation, and interest paid by the 
central bank on excess reserves held with the commercial banks themselves (Amdt, 1979). 
Private banks have not been able to increase their market shares in competition with 
state banks. This can be explained by the fact that state banks receive enormous subsidies 
and special treatment from the government, as previously discussed, and that the government 
places severe obstacles on the private banks' expansion (McLeod, 1984). These expansion 
restrictions include restrictions on physical (branch) expansion and ability to obtain a foreign 
exchange license. National private banks are prohibited (except in "special circumstances") 
fi*om opening new branches in larger cities such as Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya, 
Medan, Palembang, and Ujung Pandang, where demand for banking services is high. 
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Foreign banks are only allowed to operate in Jakarta. Inability to provide foreign currency 
facilities effectively preclude the non-foreign-exchange banks fix>m providing services 
required by larger corporate clients. 
In summary, the financial sector in Indonesia is dominated by state banks. It is 
apparently designed so as to help the government to carry out its economic policies. This 
domination is very crucial for monetary policies where money and capital markets have not 
developed. Overprotection of these state banks, however, could inhibit the development of 
private banks and healthy competition. 
Moji-banR finantial institutions 
A non-bank financial institution is a non-bank and non-insurance financial institution, 
the main activity of which is mobilizing funds by issuing commercial paper (Bank Indonesia, 
Report of the financial year 1982/1983). 
The non-bank financial institutions movement practically began in the early 1970s. It 
was part of the government's campaign to induce the development of money and capital 
markets. As usual, the government took the initiative and was directly involved in the 
process. Bank Lidonesia or the state banks are the majority shareholders in almost all of the 
non-bank financial institutions. Ail of the state commercial banks have investment finaiice 
affiliates. 
Basically, there are two types of non-bank financial institutions: (1) development 
finance and (2) investment finance. Development finance corporations are mainly engaged in 
extending medium and long-term credits, and joining equity participation in other companies. 
Their funds are mainly mobilized by issuing medium and long-term commercial paper. 
Investment finance corporations are mainly engaged in brokerage and the underwriting of 
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commercial paper. Their funds are mobilized by using commercial paper. They are not 
allowed to accept deposits nor to extend loans. 
In reality, investment finance corporations extend a large amount of loans disguised 
under the name of investment (McLeod, 1984). Actually, they have been used by the state 
commercial banks (and Bank Indonesia) as means to extend credits to various sectors and 
activities which otherwise are impossible because of government regulations. In addition, 
since there is no control on interest rates charged by non-bank financial institution, the 
interest rate charged by the investment financial corporations is higher than the official rate. 
Non-bank financial institutions grew rapidly. Their numbers increased from only 
one in 1972 to 13 in 1980. Their total assets also increased fromRp 75 billion in 1976 to Rp 
947 billion in 1983. 
Capital and Money Markets 
Both capital and money markets are still in the early stages of development in 
Indonesia. Government bonds do not exist in a free market This is partly due to the 
government's commitment to keep a balanced budget and to the fact that the government can 
always borrow from the central bank should there be a budget deficit As has already been 
discussed in the previous section, the central bank is a part of government 
A stock market actually has existed since the Dutch colonization era. It was 
temporarily closed in 1942-1952 due to the World War n and the war of independence. It 
was reopened again in 1952. The stock market was practically dormant in the early 1960s, 
and eventually closed in 1968, due to the nationalization of Dutch companies and 
hyperinflation. It was activated again in 1977 with the opening of the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange. Prior to this reopening the government established three organizations to guide 
and regulate the stock exchange, namely: (1) the Capital Market Policy Council, to assist the 
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government in formulating policies and regulations regarding stock markets; (2) the Capital 
Market Operations Board, to control and operate the capital market in conformity with 
government policies and to evaluate companies which intend to go public; (3) the National 
Investment Trust (P.T. Danareksa) to facilitate the participation of small investors in the 
stock market 
P.T. Danareksa practically creates or guarantees the existence of the stock market. 
This is done through the following arrangement P.T. Danereksa has the option of taking up 
to SO percent of the newly issued shares of companies going public. Against these shares, 
P.T. Danareksa issues small nominal value of bearer certificates and sells them to the public 
through branches of state banks throughout the country at no transaction cost The buyers of 
the certificates can resell their holdings to P.T. Danareksa at any time at the prevailing market 
price through the same network. The holders of the certificates receive dividends equal to 
those paid on the shares they represent 
Generous tax incentives are given to both investors and companies that sell their 
equity to the public. Investment is tax deductible and free from property tax. The yields and 
the capital gains are also tax exempt Companies that have some portion of their equity in 
public hands are entitled to various tax privileges. 
The practice of issuing back-to-back certificates is being phased out in favor of the 
mutual fund concept The first mutual fund certificates (Series A) were issued in April-June 
1981. The fund comprised shares in five listed companies as well as short-term money 
market assets. The fund certificates are attractive because of two interesting features. First, 
the certificates may be sold to P.T. Danareksa at any time at a price based on the current 
value of the portfolio, but in any case no less than the nominal issue price of the certificates. 
Second, P.T. Danareksa guarantees to pay a dividend not less than the interest rate on a state 
bank time deposit of 12-months maturity. These provisions mean the fund certificates are 
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almost as liquid as demand dq>osits, and yet cany a return at least as high as time deposits at 
no risk (McLeod, 1984). 
Companies, however, have been reluctant to sell their equities. This, partly, is due 
to a strong desire to avoid the dilution of ownership, the fact that sufRcient amounts of 
credits can be obtained from state banks and non-bank financial institutions at low interest 
rates, and that public disclosure requirements associated with listing are disadvantageous for 
companies which traditionally negotiate their tax liabilities with tax officials. 
The money market is still very thin. This in part is due to the non-availability of high 
quality negotiable debt, such as government bonds. The number of large and sound private 
companies is very small. The market for commercial paper, therefore, is very limited. If 
secondary trading in commercial papers ever occurs, it will largely be confined to repurchase 
by the issuers (McLeod, 1984). 
The most active money market is that for interbank funds transactions. The interbank 
money market was introduced in April 1974. Originally, it was intended for commercial 
banks, members of the Jarkarta clearing house. Later, non-bank financial institutions also 
became involved. Under initial arrangements, illiquid banks borrowed from liquid banks on 
a short-term basis of no more than seven working days to meet their clearing obligations. 
The instrument later was expanded to include promissory notes and certificates of deposits 
(Nasution, 1982). 
Another major step toward a more sophisticated capital and money markets was the 
introduction of Bank Indonesia interest-bearing certificates (Sertifikat Bank Indonesia) in 
1984. This certificate plays the same role as the government bonds, that is, to facilitate open 
market operations. The initial denominations of the certificates are quite large, Rp 50 million, 
Rp 250 million and Rp 1 billion. Bank Indonesia sells the certificates to commercial banks 
and non-bank financial institutions only. The certificate may then be traded among banks. 
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financial institutions, and the general public as well. It is still too early to evaluate the 
performance of these certificates. 
Monetary Policies 
As it has been mentioned earlier, the Indonesian capital and money markets are still in 
an early stage of development Bank Indonesia certificates, which are expected to play the 
same roles as government bonds play in most developed countries, were introduced in 1984. 
Open market operations, therefore, are not feasible in such a situation. 
Prior to the financial liberalization of June 1983, money supply control had been 
conducted using direct controls, namely overall and selective credit ceilings. Other 
conventional money supply control instruments, such as a reserve requirement and discount 
rate have been ineffective due to inconsistencies among various policies. Deposit and loan 
rates were also controlled. The government lifted all these direct controls in June 1983. 
This study covers the situation prior to the financial liberalization only. Monetary policies 
discussed in this section, thus, will be focused on the situation prior to the liberalization era. 
Nonetheless, the liberalization policies will also be reviewed at the end of the chapter. 
Direct credit controls 
Direct credit controls include overall and selective credit ceilngs. An overall credit 
ceiling is a limitation of the total credits advanced by monetary institutions. In other words, 
there is an upper limit of total credits. A selective credit ceiling, on tiie other hand, is a 
limitation on how the credits should be allocated among various economic sectors and 
activities. 
An overall credit ceiling is intended to control the aggregate money supply. Selective 
credit controls may be used as a means of subsidizing certain sectors and directing the 
distribution of economic development. 
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Ifistoricaily, credit control is one of the oldest monetary policy instruments used in 
Indonesia. The first known credit-ceiling policies were imposed on credit extended by the 
foreign exchange banks in 1953. More restrictive credit controls were imposed during the 
1958-1966 hyperinflationary period. These policies, however, failed to control inflation due 
to the excessive government deficits. 
Credit ceiling policies were introduced again on April 6,1974, as part of a policy 
package to fight reemerged accelerating inflation. The banking system was very liquid at that 
time, mainly due to the oil export boonL The reserve requirement was not adequate to 
prevent the excessive expansion of bank credits. It should also be clear that since 1966, 
there had been some form of credit ceiling required by the International Monetary Fund's 
(IMF) stand-by agreement But this, however, was merely a commitment by the central 
bank to limit overall credit expansion (Amdt, 1979). 
The credit ceiling system was operated as follows (Amdt, 1979). At the beginning 
of each year, the central bank set ceiUngs, expressed in Rp billion but translatable into 
percentage increases, to the expansion of credit permitted to each bank for each priority 
sector. The central bank negotiated the ceilings with each bank in determining its credit 
allocation. The credit ceiling allocation is based on the credit realization of the bank in the 
past and its plan for the forthcoming year. The ceilings were subject to periodical upward 
revisions, adjustments in special circumstances, and requests from individual banks. 
Between 1974-1976 the ceilings were determined on a quarterly basis. Due to the 
difficulties of implementation and control, the ceilings were changed to armual basis. Each 
bank, however, had to observe its ceilings on monthly basis (Nasution, 1982). Failure to 
Tnaintain its Credit within the ceilings would result in a fine. 
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Most banks had on the average kept their credit expansion within their ceilings. This 
is true, at least, on paper. The periodical adjustments of the ceilings may also have 
contributed to this apparent compliance. 
The credit ceilings were the main instrument of controlling the money supply during 
1974-1983 period. The ceilings rendered reserve requirements ineffective for money supply 
control. 
Central bank credits 
Although the central bank may have had difficulty reducing the money supply due to 
the lack of instruments to do so, increasing the money supply was is not a problem at all. 
The central bank can always increase the money supply by direct lending to the private 
sector, or indirectly by increasing advances to commercial banks. Central bank credits 
directly affect the monetary base, and, hence, the money supply. 
Central bank direct credit to the private sector goes primarily to state enterprises. 
Although its share in over all banking system credit is decreasing, its absolute value is still 
significant and increasing. In 1970, direct credit lending was only Rp 97 billion or 26.8 
percent of total banking system credit to the private sector, whereas in 1983 the value 
increased to Rp 2356 billion or 15.4 percent of total banking system credit to the private 
sector. 
Credit to commercial banks may be divided into two types: emergency liquidity 
credits, and refinancing for 'special programs'. Emergency liquidity credit, commonly 
called the discount window facility, is given to commercial banks facing liquidity problems. 
Commercial banks are discouraged from frequent use of this facility. 
The refinancing facility consists of central bank credit to state commercial banks for 
the purpose of financing government "special programs," such as agricultural credits to small 
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fanners and investment and capital credits to indigenous businesses. The portion of the 
refinancing matching fund varies according the sector priority. The interest rates charged to 
the commercial banks also vary, depending upon lending rates which are determined by 
Bank of Indonesia. In any case, the interest rates are very low because this facility is partly 
intended to subsidize the state commercial banks (Amdt, 1979; Nasution, 1982). 
Li addition to subsidizing state commercial banks, the main purposes of the 
refinancing facility are: (1) directing credits to certain priority sectors; (2) subsidizing the 
borrowers by charging a low loan rate; (3) an indirect way for Bank Indonesia to advance 
credits to the private sector. 
Credit from Bank Indonesia has become the most important source of funds for 
commercial banks. The commercial banks have become very dependent on this, which 
makes it difficult to stop it or even to reduce it without a liquidity crisis in the banking 
system. A significant reduction of the refinancing credit might lead to unacceptable losses to 
state commercial banks, since the credit contains a subsidy element Moreover, since 
lending to priority sectors such as small farming and indigenous business involves political 
issues, it may even be necessary to increase the amount of credits from year to year. The 
central bank, dierefoie, may have locked into this refinancing system. This excessive 
refinancing facility has become an "open window" through which state commercial banks 
have access to reserve money at their discretion (Amdt, 1979). This reduces the ability of 
the central bank to control reserves for money-supply management. 
Interest rates 
Prior to June 1983, both deposit and loan rates at state commercial banks were 
controlled by the government. The interest rates at private and foreign commercial banks 
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have always been Aeely flexible. The banking system, however, is dominated by the state 
commercial banks, as already discussed in the previous section. 
Soon after inflation was brought under control, a comprehensive saving scheme to 
mobilize domestic fimds was launched in October 1968. Attractive deposit rates ranging 
from 18 percent per year for a 3-month time deposit to 72 percent per year for a 12-month 
time deposit were offered by the s^te commercial banks. The deposits were guaranteed by 
the government It was the first time ex-post real deposit rates were positive. The deposit 
rates were finequently adjusted downward as inflation rates fell. Upward adjustment for 
increasing inflation has never been tried. As the result, the ex-post real interest rate for a 12-
month time deposit was negative again during the re-emergence of inflation between 1973-
1976 and between 1979-1983. This is one indication of financial repression as hypothesized 
by McKinnon (1973). That is, government control of the deposit rate may have inhibited 
depository institutions development 
Loan rates at the state commercial banks were veiy complicated. Different loan rates 
were assigned to different economic categories. There were about 60 categories at the latest 
classification. 
The average loan rate at the state commercial banks could very well be lower than the 
cost of mobilizing the funds (deposit rates plus transactions costs). To cover this loss, the 
government subsidized the state commercial banks through deposit rate subsidies and 
refinancing facilities. Deposit rate subsidies were commonly given for longer term deposits. 
The main purpose of interest rate policy was to mobilize deposits and to keep 
financial costs low in various priority sectors. It was not intended for discretionary money 
supply control. 
The first step toward interest rate liberalization was taken in January 1978, with the 
liberalization of interest rates paid by state commercial banks for deposits of less than 6 
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months maturify. All deposit and loan rates have been freed since June 1983, except loan 
rates for commercial credits to farmers and small business. 
Reserve requirement 
Originally, the reserve requirement was introduced to protect depositors by ensuring 
some minimum level of bank liquidity. Later, the reserve requirement has also been used as 
monetary policy instrument (Luckett, 1984). 
Although theoretically possible, the reserve requirement is not used for the day-to-
day management of the money supply. The main problem with the reserve requirement is its 
inflexibility. A small change in the reserve requirement can cause a huge change in the 
money supply. Administratively, on the other hand, small changes could be bothersome. 
More importantly, when small changes in the reserve requirement necessitate substantial 
shifts among commercial bank assets, commercial banks would need some time for this 
adjustment Frequent change in reserve requirement, therefore, could be disruptive. 
Portfolio adjustments to accommodate the reserve requirement changes are costly to 
commercial banks. The reserve requirement itself is a cost since it earns little or no interest. 
A continuous increase in the reserve requirement would not be feasible. 
The same is true for Indonesia. The reserve requirement has never been used for 
dynamic money supply management. The first reserve requirement was imposed at 30 
percent of current liabilities in May 1957. Since then, the reserve requirement has only been 
changed once to 15 percent on December 30,1977. This reduction of the reserve 
requirement was actually not intended to the increase money supply because the reserve 
requirement was redundant and ineffective as an instrument for controlling bank credit 
expansion. Commercial banks already had continuous excess reserve due to the credit 
ceiling restrictions. This, of course, was costly. A reduction of the reserve requirement 
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would enable the bank to get some interest income from the highor excess reserve deposit at 
the central bank. Bank Indonesia offered to pay 6 percent interest on excess reserves held 
with it up to an amount equal to the required reserves, to discourage the commercial banks 
from transferring their funds abroad (Amdt, 1979). 
Exchange rate 
The exchange rate has been widely used as a means for balance of payments 
adjustment It is obvious that the exchange rate is very important for international trade since 
it directly affects the relative price of tradeable goods. The exchange rate is basically the 
relative price of two monies. That is, it is the price of foreign money in terms of domestic 
money. Naturally, an exchange rate change means a change in the relative price of these 
monies, and from simple demand theory, the quantity demanded of the monies would also 
change. The change in the quantities demanded of these monies will trigger capital flows. 
The exchange rate, therefore, affects the current and capital accounts of the balance of 
payments. Since the balance of payments is theoretically identical with the change in foreign 
exchange reserves of the central bank, which is part of the monetary base, the exchange rate 
is also important for monetary policy. More on this can be found in Bergstrand (1984, 
1955). 
Prior to 1966, the exchange rate system in Indonesia was complex and restrictive. 
There were many buying and selling rates for various categories of transactions. Moreover, 
the exchange rate structure was frequently changed (at least once a year since 1955). At each 
time of change, the name of the exchange devices were also changed (Kanesa-Thasan, 1966; 
Corden and Mackie, 1962). The exchange rate policy was used not only for balance of 
payments adjustment but also for generating revenue to the government Unfortunately, the 
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exchange rate restrictions caused trade smuggling and a foreign exchange black market 
which might have actually reduced the government's revenue. 
The exchange rate system was simplified in October 1966 as part of the New Order 
government program to stabilize price and to liberalize the economy from the previous 
"guided economy" campaign. Between 1966-1968, exchange rates for most exports and 
imports were allowed to float in a free exchange market. The exchange rate increased 
quickly, the main rate changed from Rp 85/U.S. $ in 1966 to Rp 326/U.S. $ in 1969. To 
reduce the inflationary effects of further devaluation, the government intervened and fixed 
the exchange rates in 1969. The exchange rates were unified in April 1970. 
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in the early 1970s, all major 
currencies have been freely floating. Under such a situation, the government feels that 
pegging to single currency such as the U.S. dollar may not be appropriate anymore. The 
exchange rate system, then, changed to a managed basket peg in November 1978. The 
exchange rate is adjusted daily based on a basket of currencies of major trading partners. 
The currencies and weights used to determine the exchange rate, however, are not made 
public by the government 
In reality, however, the exchange rate system is leaning toward a more stable (fixed) 
exchange (Gray, 1982). The government does not follow the weighted basket exchange rate 
closely. Clearly, the exchange rate is a policy variable for the government 
The June 1983 Financial Liberalization Policy 
As was discussed in the previous section, interest rates and bank credit used to be 
directly controlled by the government. A dramatic policy change on June 2, 1983, lifted 
most of the controls. The major provisions of the June financial liberalization policy are: (1) 
State banks are free to determine their own fixed and lending rate except for certain priority 
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borrowers such as farmers, small holders, small scale enterprises and private estates, (2) 
Credit ceilings and refinancing facilities are abolished except for pnoiity categories. (3) The 
20% withholding tax on dollar denominated deposit was abolished. 
With the liberalization policy the central bank no longer had the means to control the 
money supply, other than, perhaps, persuasion. A step to facilitate open market operations 
was, then, taken by the introduction of new discount facilities and Bank Indonesia bearer 
certificates. The discount window is intended to help banks with temporary liquidity 
problems. There are two discount facilities, (1) a short term discount for assistance ranging 
from a few days up to two weeks. This assistance is renewable, at rising interest rates, up to 
a total of four weeks. (2) a long term discount for assistance up to two months, with a 
possible extension up to a maximum of four months. This is intended to help banks with a 
liquidity problem due to their inexperience in managing assets in a flexible interest rate 
environment (Rosendale, 1984). 
The Bank Indonesia certificate (Sertifikat Bank Indonesia=SBI) is similar to 
government bonds in most other countries. Trading the SBIs would form a market in which 
open market operations can be conducted to implement monetary policies. Originally, the 
interest rates were determined by Bank Indonesia. As sales shifted to an auction system, the 
interest rates were then determined by market forces. 
As expected, the liberalization policy has led to very volatile interest rates. This is 
especially due to the removal of refinancing facilities from Bank hidonesia which caused 
drastic liquidity losses to the banking system. In addition, a more flexible exchange rate 
caused the transfer of rupiah deposits into dollar deposits. The bank liquidity shortage 
culminated with the September crisis in 1984 when the interbanks' call-money interest rate 
reached 90 percent. 
40 
CHAPTER ni. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND THE MODEL 
As mentioned earlier, the essence of this study is to model the interrelationships 
among investment, gross domestic product, monetary aggregates, and the balance of 
payments. The simplified structure of the model is presented in Figure 1. 
The demand for monetary assets wiU determine the banking system credits for a 
given price level and gross national product The balance of payment and banking system 
credits determine the money supply for a given gross domestic product. The integration 
between the monetary sector and the external sector (balance of payments), therefore, will 
determine the price level for a given gross domestic product From the previous chapter, it 
should also be clear that interest rates and the exchange rate are exogenous, being controlled 
by the government during the period of this study (1976 quarter one to 1983 quarter one). 
The adjustment variable in the financial markets, then, is the price level. The real sector, real 
investment and production functions, will close the model to obtain estimates for gross 
domestic product and real investment 
Balance of Payment and Money Supply 
Since it is crucial for this study, the interrelationship between the balance of 
payments and the money supply will be shown in this section. The money supply functions 
will also be derived. 
Money is a liability of the banking system (monetary authorities and commercial 
banks) to the private sector. Money supply, then, can be determined using information from 
the banking system's consolidated balance sheet 
The monetary authorities (central bank, and treasury central banking activities, such 
as notes and coins issuance) balance sheet is presented in Table 6. From the table, we get 
the following identity: 
1 f 
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flow 
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deposit at the 
central bank 
Figure 1. Conceptual structure of the Indonesian Monetary Sector Model 
42 
Table 6. Monetary authorities' balance sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Foreign assets (CFA) 
Claims on government (CGC) 
Claims on private sector (CDC) 
Claims on deposit money banks (CBC) 
Other assets (COA) 
Currency in circulation (CC) 
Bank reserves (RES) 
Private sector deposit (DDC) 
Foreign currency and other deposit (FDC) 
Government deposit (CGD) 
Foreign liabilities (CFL) 
Capital (CCAP) 
Other liabilities (CAL) 
Table 7. Balance sheet of deposit money banks 
Assets Liabilities 
Foreign assets (BFA) 
Claims on government (BGC) 
Claims on private sector (BPC) 
Other assets (BOA) 
Reserves (RES) 
Demand deposit (DDB) 
Saving and time deposit (ST) 
Foreign currency deposits (FDB) 
Borrowing from central bank (CBC) 
Foreign liabilities (BFL) 
Government deposits (BGD) 
Capital (BCAP) 
Other liabilities (BAL) 
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CC + DDC + FDC = (CFA-CFL) + (CGC-CGD) + CDC + CBC 
+ COA-RES-CCAP-CAL (1) 
The deposit money banks' (commercial banks') balance sheet is given in Table 7. 
From the table, we have the following identity: 
DDB + ST + FOB = (BFA-BFL) + (BGC-BGD) + BPC - CBC 
+ BOA + RES - BCAP - BAL (2) 
From (1) and (2), we get the consolidated balance sheet of the monetary system: 
CC + (DDB+DDC) + ST + (FDB+FDC) = NFA 
+ NGC + CDC + BPC + OTHER (3) 
where: DD = DDB + DDC = Demand deposit 
FD = FDB + FDC = Foreign currency (dollar) deposit 
NFA = CFA + BFA - CFL - BFL = Net foreign assets of the banking system 
NGC = CGC + BGC - CGD - BGD = Net government borrowing 
CDC = Central bank direct credit to the private sector 
BPC = Commercial bank loans to the non-government sector 
OTHER = COA + BOA-CCAP-BCAP-CAL-BAL . 
The left-hand side of equation (3) is actually the broadly defined money supply (M3): 
M3 = CC + DD + ST + FD (4) 
Equation (3), therefore, can be rewritten as: 
M3 = NFA + NGC + CDC + BPC + OTHER (5) 
Clearly, the net foreign assets of the consolidated monetary system is not affected by 
foreign capital borrowing. Foreign capital borrowing by the monetary system will increase 
both the asset and liability sides, leaving the net position unchanged. The net foreign assets 
of the monetary system changes only because of an unbalanced current account and capital 
inflows into the non-bank sector. This is called the balance of payments. The balance of 
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payments is identical with the change in the monetary authorities' net foreign assets. Hence, 
the change in the net foreign assets of the monetary system should be equal to the balance of 
payments. 
The change in net government borrowing from the monetary system reflects the 
additional funds required to fîll the budget deficit. Changes in central bank direct credit and 
commercial bank loans will reflect the flow of central bank direct credit and commercial bank 
loans to private sector, respectively. 
With these clarifications, we are now ready to look at the sources of change in the 
money supply. Rewriting equation (5) in its differential form we get: 
(1 - L)M3 = BOP + DGB + DCP + FBP + RESM (6) 
where: L = Lag operator 
DGB = (1-L) NGC = Flow of government borrowing from the central bank 
DCP = (1-L) CDC = Flow of central bank direct credit 
FBP = (1-L) BPC = Flow of conunercial bank loans to the private sector 
BOP = (1-L) NFA = Balance of payments surplus 
RESM = Residual. 
Capital gains due to changes in the exchange rate have been included in RESM. 
Assuming that the OTHER components are constant in the short run, then there are 
three sources of change in the money supply: changes in foreign assets, credit to 
govOTunent, and credit to the private sector. Foreign assets are usually not under the control 
of the monetary authorities. In most developing countries, money supply control policies are 
usually directed through controls in credit to the government and credit to the private sector. 
To reduce the money supply, for example, credit to the government may be reduced through 
budget austerity programs or tax increases to reduce budget deficit. Credit to the private 
sector is usually controlled through a credit ceiling. 
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For empirical studies, the money supply is commonly specified through its 
relationship with the monetary base. The reason for this is that the central banks usually 
control the money supply by controlling the monetary base or the money multiplier. 
In an open economy, the monetary base is directly related to the balance of payments. 
This can be easily shown by rearranging the monetary authorities' balance sheet identity (1): 
BASE = CC + RES = NFER + NGL + CBC + CDC + RESB (7) 
where: BASE = Monetary base 
NFER = CFA - CFL = Net foreign exchange reserve 
NGL = Net government liability to the central bank 
RESB = COA - CCAP - CAL. 
The balance of payments is identical with the change in the net foreign assets of the monetary 
authorities. 
The monetary base can be linked to the money supply either through the familiar 
multiplier approach (Luckett, 1984) or behavioral equation (Brunner and Meltzer, 1968). 
The multiplier formula is: 
M2 = BASE (8) 
RD + K + X + TRT 
where: M2 = Broad money 
K = Currency-demand deposit ratio 
T = Time - demand ^ deposits ratio 
X = Excess reserve - demand deposit ratio 
RD = Required reserve ratio for demand deposit 
RT = Required reserve ratio for time deposit. 
The main problem with the multiplier formula is the possibility that the multiplier is 
not stable. Accordingly, each ratio, K, T, and X, should be specified with a behavioral 
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equation (Aghevli, 1977; Nasution, 1982). A simpler way to specify the money supply 
may be by formulating a behavioral equation (Brunner and Meltzer, 1968; Argy, 1985). 
Reserves may be divided into two components, required reserves and excess 
reserves. For consistency with the next derivation, both broad money and reserves will be 
defined in real terms: 
CCR = Currency in circulation in real terms 
DDR = Demand deposits in real terms 
TDR = Time deposits in real terms 
ERR = Excess reserves in real terms 
RESR = Reserves in real terms 
RA = The average required reserve on total deposits. 
The desired holding of excess reserves is assumed to be a function of total deposits 
and opportunity cost The demand for real currency is a function of expected inflation and 
real gross domestic product. 
M2R = CCR + DDR + TDR 
RESR = RA (DDR + TDR) + ERR 
where: M2R = Broad money in real terms 
(9) 
(10) 
ERR = eg - ej INT + eg (DDR+TDR) 
CCR = cq • Cj IFE + C2 GDPR 
where: INT = Interest rate 
IFE = Expected inflation 
GDPR = Real gross domestic product. 
From (10) and (11), total reserves may be rewritten as: 
RESR = eo - ei INT + R(DDR+TDR) 
where: R = RA + eg 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
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Clearly, R must be less than one because not all additional deposits would be deposited at the 
central bank as reserves. 
By rearranging (9), (12), and (13), one can easily find that 
M2R® = 1/R(CQR. - CQ- eg + BASER + CJ (1-R) IFE 
- C2 (1-R) GDPR + eilNT) (14) 
where: BASER = CCR + RESR = Monetary base in real terms. 
Equation (14) is the long-run money-supply function consistent with desired excess reserve 
and the demand for currency. Clearly, the long-run money supply is positively related to the 
monetary base, expected inflation and interest rate, but negatively related to gross domestic 
product. 
Due to various constraints, particularly govermnent credit controls, the long run 
money supply may not be achieved at any moment of time. Assuming that the adjustment 
process toward the long run money supply is adaptive, the money supply may be written as: 
M2Rt = m(M2RtS-M2Rt.i) + M2Rt.i (15) 
The adjustment coefficient, m, is dependent on the government is credit controls. The 
primary purpose of the credit controls is to reduce inflation. Therefore, the speed of 
adjustment would be negatively related to inflation. That is, the credit control would be more 
restrictive when inflation is increasing. As credit falls, excess reserves will increase and the 
money supply will fall. The demand for money increases with gross domestic product. The 
speed of adjustment would be positively related to real gross domestic product if the 
government accommodates the increase in the demand for money. Hence, the speed of 
adjustment is assumed a function of expected inflation and real gross domestic product: 
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m = mo- + 1112 (16) 
M2RS( - M2Rt.i M2R®t " M2Ft.i 
From (14) - (16), the money supply function may be written as: 
M2Rt = l/R(miQ(C(^-C0-eQ) + mgBASERt + mgeilNTt 
+ (mQCi - mgCiR - miR)IFEt + (moC2R - moC2 + m2R)GDPR( 
+ (l-mo)M2Rt.i) (17) 
The sign for both expected inflation and real gross domestic product become ambiguous. If 
mi is large enough, the coefficient for expected inflation will be negative. If m2 is large, the 
coefficient for real gross domestic product will be positive. 
For empirical estimation, the opportunity cost of holding reserves will be represented 
by the foreign interest rate. There are no government bonds, and the capital market is still 
underdeveloped. Expected inflation will be represented by the current inflation rate. 
Mathematical Presentation of the Model 
This section discusses the specification of the Lidonesian monetary sector model. 
The discussion includes derivation of each behavioral equation, its independent variables, 
and expected directional relationship with the independent variables. The summary of the 
model is presented in Table 8. All equations are in general form. The actual form will be 
determined by empirical results. 
Equations (18)-(21) are demand functions for currency in circulation, demand 
deposit, saving and time deposits, and foreign currency (dollar) deposits, respectively. 
Traditionally, the demand for real financial assets is assumed to be a function of the return 
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Table 8. Mathematical structure of the Indonesian monetary sector model (See Appendix I 
for variable names) 
CCR = CCR(IFE, GDPR, LAG(CCR), SI, S2, S3) (18) 
DDBR = DDBR (IFE, GDPR, LAG(DDBR), SI, S2, S3) (19) 
STR = STR(IFE, DRN, MAR, LAG(STR), SI, S2, S3) (20) 
FDBR = FDBR(EDE,D,LIB,MAR,LAG(FDBR)) (21) 
M2R = M2R(IFA, LIB, BASER, GDPR, LAG(M2R), SI, S2, S3) (22) 
LOANR = LOANR(IFA, (DDBR + STR + FDBR + BGD/CPI + CBC/CPI), 
GDPR, LAG(IJOANR)) (23) 
NOXPD = NOXPD(PWNO/CPI, GDP) (24) 
EXSVD = EXSVD(FNP,LAGCEXSVD)) (25) 
IMPD = IMFD(PWIM/CPI, GDP) (26) 
0rnD=0rnD(0XPD,LAG(0mD)) (27) 
TIPD = TIPD(IMPD, GDP-TAX) (28) 
GIMSVD = OIMSVD(IMPD,LAG(OIMSVD)) (29) 
TPCR = TPCR(EDE, LIB,(OXPD + NOXPD - IMPD/ CPI, GDPR, LTSLR) (30) 
DGC = DGC(BOP, DIF(CBC), DIF(CDC), DIF(OCDC)) (31) 
PWNO = PWNO(CPIW*EXC, LAG(PWNO)) (32) 
PWIM = PWIM(CPIW*EXC, LAG(PWIM)) (33) 
INVR = INVR(DIF(GDPR), (DIFÇLOAN + CDC) + FDID)/CPI, LAG(INVR)) (34) 
GDPR = CDPR(KPS, GES/CPI) (35) 
TAX = TAX(GDP, LAG(OXPD)) (36) 
M2R = CCR + DDBR + STR (37) 
CPI = LAG(CPI) + IFA (38) 
Table 8. (continued) 
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BOP = OXPD + NOXPD + EXS VD + TPCR*CPI + FDID + AID - IMPD - UPD - OmD 
- OIMSVD + RESB (39) 
BASE = BOP - DGC + DIF(CBC) + DIF(CDC) + DIF(OCDC) + LAG(BASE) (40) 
GDP = GDPR*CPI (41) 
MAR = CCR + DDBR + STR + FDBR (42) 
LOAN = LOANR*CPI (43) 
GES = TAX + AID - DGC + RESG (44) 
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from holding the asset, its opportunity cost, and a scale variable. The scale variable may be 
considered as a proxy variable for transaction needs or as a constraint on holding the asset. 
The most commonly used scale variables are income and wealth. For Keynesians who argue 
that the motive of holding mon^r is for transactions and speculation, then the national 
income would be the appropriate variable to proxy the volume of transactions. Monetarists, 
on the other hand, argue that money is a financial asset that produces services. Total wealth 
would be the constraint of holding various assets (Friedman, 1956). Whether income or 
wealth should be used in the financial assets demand function is really an empirical matter. 
Income may be more appropriate for assets which are primarily used for transactions 
whereas total wealth may be more appropriate for assets which are used primarily as a store 
of value. For currency in circulation and demand deposits, income should be more 
appropriate for scale variables, since they are primarily used for transactions. Dollar 
deposits are not readily applicable for transactions. They are primarily used to earn interest. 
Total financial wealth may be more appropriate as a constraint on holding dollar deposit 
Saving and time deposits are not directly applicable for transactions purposes, but may be 
more liquid than dollar deposits. Either income or total financial wealth may be appropriate 
as a scale variable for saving and time deposits. 
Alternative financial assets such as securities are not available. The inflation rate is 
very high. Expected inflation, therefore, would represent the opportunity cost of holding 
domestic monetary assets. Expected inflation is expected to be negatively related to the 
demand for each of the monetary assets. For dollar deposits, expected inflation would be 
reflected in expected devaluation. Expected devaluation is measured as the average change in 
the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate is defined as 
RER = EXC * CPIW/CPI (45) 
where: RER = Real exchange rate 
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EXC = Exchange rate 
CPI = Consumer price index 
CPIW = Trade-weighted foreign price index 
Equation (45) is differentiated to get the percentage change in real exchange rate: 
DEVR = ADE + INF-IFA (46) 
where: DEVR = Change in real exchange rate (%) 
ADE = Actual devaluation (%) 
INF = Foreign inflation (%) 
IFA = Domestic inflation (%) 
An increase in the real exchange rate reflects an undervaluation of the currency. Revaluation 
returns the exchange rate towards its original value. Assuming that the government is 
committed to maintain the real exchange rate, expected devaluation may be proxied by the 
negative average change in the real exchange rate: 
EDE = -(DEVR + LAG(DEVR) + LAG2(DEVR) + LAG3(DEVR))/4 (47) 
where: EDE = Expected devaluation. 
Expected devaluation represents the expected capital gain from holding dollar 
deposits. Expected devaluation, therefore, should be positively related to the demand for 
dollar deposit. The opportunity cost of holding dollar deposits would be the foreign dollar 
deposit interest rate, such as the London eurodollar deposit rate. Data for the interest rate on 
dollar deposits are not available. Demand for dollar deposit is expected to be positively 
related to expected devaluation and total monetary wealth, and negatively related to 
eurodollar deposit rate. A dummy variable for the adoption of the managed basket peg is 
also included. It is expected to have a positive sign since the exchange rate is changed more 
frequently. 
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Cuirency in ciiculaticm and demand deposits do not have interest earnings. Their 
demand functions, therefore, are expected to be negatively related to expected inflation, and 
positively related to gross domestic product Dummy variables are also included to capture 
seasonality. The demand for saving and time deposit is expected to be negatively related to 
expected inflation and positively related to deposit interest rates and gross domestic product 
Seasonal dummies are also included. A lagged endogenous variable is also included in each 
equation following the familiar partial adjustment process. The coefficient for the lagged 
endogenous variable should be positive and less than one. 
Equation (22) is the money supply function. The function is derived and explained 
in the previous section (17). Dummy variables are included to capture seasonality. 
Commercial bank loans to the private sector are specified by equation (23). The 
function is derived on the assumption that the loan is supply determined, but constrained by 
government credit controls. As mentioned earlier, the credit control is dependent on inflation 
and real gross domestic product Credit controls would be tightened during a high inflation. 
Real gross domestic product represents demand pressure. The government may 
accommodate the increase in demand for credit as real production is increasing. 
The loan supply is a function of loanable funds which consists of bank deposits and 
central bank advances. There are four banks deposits: demand deposits, time and saving 
deposits, dollar deposits, and the government deposit In real values, the supply may be 
written as: 
LOANRS = eo + ei TIDR (48) 
where: LOANR  ^= Desired loan supply in real terms 
TIDR = Total loanable funds in real terms. 
A loan rate is not included in the supply function since it is determined by the government 
The loan rate structure is very complicated. The loan rate is very low. 
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Due to government restrictions, commercial banks can not lend as much as they 
wish. The actual loan, therefore, is assumed to be the result of some partial adjustment 
process. 
L0ANR = C(L0ANRS-LAG(L0ANR)) + LAG(L0ANR) (49) 
The speed of adjustment C, is a function of government credit controls. Specifically, it is 
assumed to be a negative function of inflation because the government controls would be 
tightened during a high inflation, and a positive function of real gross domestic product 
because the government may accommodate the increase in loan demand: 
C = Co "(ciIFA - C2GDPR)/(L0ANRS - LAG(LOANR)) (50) 
Real commercial bank loans, therefore, can be written as: 
LOANR = egCQ + ejCoTTDR - cjIFA + C2GDPR 
+ (l-Co)LAG(LOANR) (51) 
Equation (24) is the merchandise non-oil export function. It is positively related with 
the relative price of exports to the consumer price index, and with gross domestic product 
which represents the capacity to export Oil export is assumed exogenous since it's 
determined by world demand and OPEC regulations. Export of services is represented by 
Equation (25). Export of services primarily consists of tourism and investment income. It 
is, therefore, highly dependent on the economic situation in developed countries. Export of 
services is expected to be positively related with the index of industrial production in OECD 
countries (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Disaggregated data 
for export of services are not available. 
The merchandise import function is represented by Equation (26). Naturally, 
merchandise imports will be positively related to gross national product to satisfy the 
increase in both consumption and factor-of-production needs. With regard to relative prices, 
however, the sign is ambiguous. An increase in the relative price of imported goods will 
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decrease real imports. The value of imports, however, could increase if the demand for real 
imports is inelastic. 
The import of services is divided into three categories: oil investment income 
transfer, travel and insurance payments, and other imports of services. Oil investment 
income transfer, equation (27), will clearly be positively related with oil exports. Travel and 
insurance payments includes passenger services, merchandise freight and insurance fees paid 
to other countries. Travel abroad depends on disposable income, whereas merchandise 
freight and insurance fees depend on merchandise imports. Travel and insurance payments, 
therefore, are expected to be positively related  ^disposable income and merchandise import. 
The travel and insurance payment function is presented in equation (28). Other imports of 
services are expected to be positively related to merchandise imports. Other import of 
services are given in equation (29). 
Net private capital flows, excluding direct investment, are represented by equation 
(30). Direct investment is assumed exogenous since it may be dependent on long run 
economic and political situations in both domestic and foreign countries. Various incentives 
to attract direct foreign investment is difficult to incorporate in an econometric model. Other 
private capital flows are mainly portfolio investment which is very responsive to a short run 
economic situation. It fluctuates highly. Hence, it is crucial for economic stabilization. 
Non-direct investment capital flows are expected to be negatively related with 
expected devaluation and foreign interest rates, the balance of trade, and the previous stock 
of foreign liabilities. Gross domestic product would have an ambiguous sign. Devaluation 
and foreign interest rate increases would induce domestic residents to buy foreign securities 
because of their higher returns, and foreigners to divest themselves of domestic securities. 
The net capital inflow, tlierefore, will fall. Hie balance of trade may affect net capital flows 
through trade credits. Trade credits are especially important for short-run capital flows 
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(Branson, 1968; Laffer, 1975; Kenen, 1978). These include credits advanced by foreigners 
to finance imports, and credit advanced by domestic residents to finance exports. An 
increase in gross domestic product would trigger economic activities and improve foreigners' 
confidence in the economy. This would increase the need for foreign capital and makes 
foreigners more willing to lend their capital. this case, gross domestic product is 
positively related with net capital inflows. On Ae other hand, an increase in national income 
may increase investment abroad and reduce the need for foreign borrowing. In this case, 
gross national product is negatively related with net capital inflows. An already high amount 
of foreign liabilities should inhibit further borrowings. Hknce, the previous stock of foreign 
liabilities is negatively related with net capital inflows. 
The central bank reaction function to sterilize the effect of the balance of payments on 
the money supply is represented by equation (31). Sterilization is conducted using the 
govenmient deposit at the central bank. A similar technique of sterilization is used in other 
countries like Chile and Brazil (Miller and Askin, 1976). During a balance of payments 
surplus the government increases its deposit at the central bank. A major portion of the 
government revenue comes Aom the oil export tax. Depositing part of the revenue at the 
central bank prevents it &om flowing into the domestic economy, which could cause 
inflation. The government deposit at the central bank, therefore, is expected to be positively 
related to the balance of payments. The government deposit at the central bank may also be 
used to neutralize the effects of other events affecting domestic credit or the money supply. 
For instance, the government's deposit may be increased if the central bank credit to 
commercial banks, direct credit to private sector, or other credit is increasing. Accordingly, 
the government's deposit at the central bank is positively related to the change in central bank 
claims against conmiercial banks, against the private sector, or changes in other domestic 
credits. 
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Price linkages between domestic and foreign prices of exports and imports will close 
the external sector. These linkages provide a direct connection between the exchange rate 
and both exports and imports, as it should be. This direct linkage is missing in some 
previous models 0»Jasution, 1982; Aghevli, 1977). 
The wholesale price of non-oil exported goods should be positively related with the 
foreign price index denominated in domestic currency, that is, the weighted foreign price 
index multiplied by the exchange rate. This relationship is given by equation (32). 
Similarly, the wholesale price of imported goods should be positively related with foreign 
prices denominated in domestic currency (33). 
The investment function is given by equation (34). This function is essentially a 
modified flexible accelerator model, to incorporate the institutional characteristics of a 
developing economy. The neoclassical investment model developed by Jorgenson (1969) 
may not be appropriate due to various market imperfections such as in the financial and labor 
markets. For a developing economy like Didonesia, emphasis should be given to financial 
and resource constraints on capital formation. 
The flexible accelerator investment model is derived from two equations. The first is 
that desired real capital stock (KPS^*) is proportional to real output (GDPR) 
KPSd=aGDPR (52) 
The second one is that the change in actual real investment (INVR) is proportional to the 
difference between the desired (INVR^) and previous actual investment: 
INVR - LAG(INVR) = b(INVRd . LAG(INVR)) (53) 
Following Coen (1973), underlying economic conditions may affect the investment function 
through the accelerator b. That is, various economic variables may affect the response of 
investors to the gap between desired and actual investment One of the main constraints on 
investment in a developing country is the availability, rather than the cost, of financial 
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resources (McKirmon, 1973). Specifically, since other sources of external business 
financing are practically non-existent, the constraint is banking credit In an open economy, 
direct foreign investment may also make a significant contribution to this investment 
function. Real interest rates on bank loans are very low due to government controls. 
Accordingly, the acceleration coefficient, b, is assumed to be a function of bank credits and 
foreign direct inviestment: 
b = bo + biCCREDR + FDIR)/(INVRd _ LAG(INVR)) (54) 
where: CREDR = real banking system credit to private sector 
FDIR = real direct foreign investment 
From (52)-(54), the private investment function can be obtained as (see equation 34) 
INVR = bi(CREDR+FDIR) + aboAGDPR + (l-bo)LAG(INVR) (55) 
Gross domestic product is determined through a production function with capital 
stock and government spending as inputs (equation 35). Labor is assumed in surplus. 
(There is no figure on the actual employment) Government spending is included since it 
may provide some infrastructure that also contributes to production. Capital stock is defined 
as accumulated investment Clearly, both capital stock and government spending should be 
positively related to gross domestic product 
Government domestic revenue (basically tax revenue) is presented in equation (36). 
The revenue should be positively related to gross national product A large amount of 
government revenue comes from the oil tax. The revenue, therefore, should be positively 
related to oil exports. Since collections from the oil tax may not be immediate, the oil tax 
variable is lagged in the tax revenue function. The rest of the equations are identities or 
definitions to make the model determinate. 
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CHAPTER IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This chapter discusses the estimation and validation of the model. In the estimation 
section, coefGcient estimates and their statistical and theoretical properties will be discussed 
equation by equation. The tracking performance of the integrated model will be discussed in 
the validation section. The tracking performance indicates how well the model represents the 
actual data. 
Estimation 
The structural model, described in Chapter DI, is nonlinear. Some of the behavioral 
equations are in exponential form (linear in logarithm), whereas some others are in linear 
form. Some of the identities or definitions are also in multiplicative form. All of these 
render the model a system of nonlinear equations. Accordingly, the estimation technique 
used for estimating the parameters is non-linear three stage least squares, N3SLS (Amemiya, 
1974; 1977). The parameters are estimated using data firom 1976 quarter one to 1983 quarter 
one. Data sources and transformations are given in Appendix n. 
One coirraion problem in the estimation process is autocorrelation. If there is no 
lagged dependent variable the autocorrelation problem may be checked using the Durbin-
Watson (DW) Statistic. D W statistic, however, is biased toward rejecting the existence of 
autocorrelation if there is a lagged dependent variable. Testing for autocorrelated 
disturbances in regressions with a lagged-dependent variable requires a large sample to be 
valid theoretically. Although this study has only 25 net observations (excluding lags), the 
estimation is conducted as if there were autocorrelation. The autocorrelation correction will 
be retained if the autocorrelation coefficient is significantly different from zero based upon a 
t-test.. 
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The autoconelation coefficient is included in an equation using the following 
procedure: 
Yt = Xp + Ut 
Uj = bUt.i + e 
E(e) = 0 
Direct estimation of P is biased because the residual, U, is autocorrelated. Fortunately, with 
little rearrangement, an estimable form can be found as: 
Yt = Xp + b LAG(Yt - Xp) + e^ 
Coefficients P along with the autocorrelation coefficient b can be estimated simultaneously, 
using the non-linear least squares method. 
Since there are not enough observations, lagged d^ndent variables are not included 
in the instrumental variables for the first stage of the N3SLS. Trials with principal 
components instruments were also conducted but did not give satisfactory results. 
The functional form and independent variables included in each equation were 
determined after conducting some experiments. The behavioral equation is selected based on 
the sign and significance of the coefficients, and the degree of the coefficient of 
determination (R^). The estimated coefRcients, t-statistics (in parentheses), R-square, and 
Dubin-Watson Statistic for each of the equations are shown in Table 9. Variables names, 
descriptions, and their units are given in Appendix I. 
Equations (l)-(4) of Table 9 represent demand functions for monetary assets. The 
statistical properties of these equations are good, with more than 90 percent of the variation 
in the demand for monetary assets explained by their respective equations. All coefficients 
have the correct sign and are significant at the 5 percent level except the intercept for currency 
in circulation and some of the seasonal dummies. It should also be mentioned that the scale 
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Table 9. Estimated model of the Indonesian monetary sector 
(1) LOGCCCR) = -0.13248 - 0.0128IFA + 0.23735 LOG(GDPR) 
(-1.12) (-6.33) (4.17) 
+ 0.66148 LAG(LOG(CCR)) - 0.02627 SI + 0.05195 S2 
(9.26) (-1.60) (3.38) 
+ 0.1945 S3 
(1.26) 
R2 = 0.9645 DW = 2.227 
(2) LOG(DDBR) = -0.59028 - 0.01217 IFA + 0.27293 LOG(GDPR) 
(-3.29) (-2.70) (4.35) 
+ 0.81778 LAG(LOG(DDBR)) + 0.02692 SI 
(19.04) (1.1) 
+ 0.07380 S2 + 0.03467 S3 
(2.95) (1.42) 
R2 = 0.9735 DW = 2.183 
(3) L0G(STR) = -0.29178 - 0.00945 IFA + 0.00928 DRN + 0.14548 LOG(MAR) 
(-2.89) (-4.27) (3.21) (5.17) 
+ 0.84012 LAG (LOG(STR)) + 0.02643 SI + 0.04978 S2 
(20.12) (2.30) (4.24) 
+ 0.01589 S3 
(1.35) 
R2 = 0.9722 DW = 1.675 
(4) LOG(FDBR) = -1.86271 + 0.03205 EDE - 0.02488 LIB + 0.88761 D 
(-3.07) (4.57) (-4.08) (7.40) 
+ 0.66420 LOG(MAR) + 0.29729 LAG(LOG(FDBR)) 
(3.40) (2.77) 
R2 = 0.9369 DW = 2.027 
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Table 9. (continued) 
(5) M2R = -4.36627 - 0.26433 IFA + 0.76622 BASE/CPI + 0.80394 LAG(M2R) 
(-4.57) (-4.82) (7.72) (26.98) 
1.055139 SI + 1.45631 S2 + 0.48094 S3 
(3.45) (4.66) (1.56) 
R2 = 0.9927 DW = 2.535 
(6) LOANR = 0.038238 + 0.12755(DDBR + STR + FDBR + BGD/CPI + CBC/CPI) 
(0.70) (4.36) 
- 0.18158 IFA) + 0.88521 LAG(LOANR) 
(-3.46) (19.74) 
R2 = 0.9896 DW = 1.931 
(7) LOG(NOXPD) = 3.76269 + 1.56332 LOG(PWNO/CPI) + 1.56332 LOG(GDP) 
(10.01) (18.18) (2.31) 
R2 = 0.9103 DW = 1.425 
(8) LOG(EXS VD) = -12.30556 + 2.67588 LOG(FNP) 
(-2.39) (2.43) 
+ 0.90541 LAG(LOG(EXSVD)) 
(19.850) 
R2 = 0.9679 DW = 1.724 
(9) LOG(IMPD) = -3.02993 + 0.15001 LOG(PWIM/CPI) + 1.13530 LOG(GDP) 
(-6.29) (0.41) (19.22) 
R2 = 0.9228 DW = 1.887 
(10) LOG(OrnD) = -1.94675 + 0.72356 LOG(OXPD) + 0.36338 LAG(LOG(OmD)) 
(-3.42) (4.44) (2.75) 
R2 = 0.9638 DW = 2.065 
(11) TDPD = 16.00833 + 0.11875 IMPD + 0.00204 (GDP - TAX) 
(6.22) (43.35) (2.49) 
R2 = 0.9986 DW = 2.152 
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Table 9. (continued) 
(12) LCXÎ(OIMSVD) = -0.78819 + 0.43227 LOG(IMPD) 
(-0.77) (1.69) 
+ 0.55820 LAG(LOG(OIMSVD)) 
(2.86) 
R2 = 0.8145 DW = 1.747 
(13) TPCR = -1.30964 - 0.04032 EDE - 0.15692 LIB 
(-2.95) (-2.31) (-4.51) 
- 0.28446 LAG((OXPD + NOXPD - IMPD)/CPI) 
(-6.36) 
+ 0.07749 GDPR - 0.02977 LTSLR - 0.44141 LAG(RESa) 
(6.85) (-4.53) (-2.53) 
R2 = 0.6465 DW = 2.147 
(14) DGC = -49.7886 + 0.80784 BOP + 0.80406 DIF(CBC) + 0.6661 DIF(CDC) 
(2.42) (15.40) (8.95) (6.59) 
+ 0.89009 DIF(OCDC) - 0.74917 LAG(RESa) 
(11.58) (-4.57) 
R2 = 0.8499 DW = 1.832 
(15) L(Xj(PWIM) = -2.00382 + 0.40508 LOG(EXC*CPIW) 
(-13.51) (14.836) 
+ 0.56767 LAGCLOG(PWÎM)) 
(19.35) 
R2 = 0.9986 DW = 1.806 
(16) LOG(PWNO) = -7.20298 + 1.00528 LOG(EXC*CPIW) 
(7.304) (8.842) 
+ 0.34791 LAG(LOG(PWNO)) + 0.78871 LAG(RESa) 
(3.963) (6.9089) 
R2= 0.9129 DW = 0.497 
®RES = Residual of corresponding regression (actual minus predicted value). 
Table 9. (continued) 
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(17) BSrVR = 0.16561 DIF(GDPR) + 0.13839(DIF(LOAN + CDC) + FDID)/CPI 
(17.32) (2.63) 
+ 0.98028 LAGCnsrVR) 
(69.52) 
R2 = 0.9697 DW = 2.900 
(18) LOG(GDPR) = 2.56486 + 0.11397 LOG(KPS) + 0.33368 LOG(GES/CPI) 
(34.56) (5.30) (10.09) 
R2 = 0.9394 DW = 2.440 
(19) TAX = -310.83 + 0.17367 GDP + 0.38761 LAG(OXPD) - 0.52165 LAG(RESa) 
(-3.07) (5.78) (2.97) (-3.67) 
R2 = 0.9466 DW = 2.238 
(20) M2R = CCR + DDBR + STR 
(21) KPS = SINVR 
(22) CPI = LAG(CPI) + IFA 
(23) BOP = OXPD + NOXPD + EXSVD + TPCR*CPI + FDID+ AID - IMPD - OITID 
OIMSVD + RESB 
(24) BASE = BOP - DGC + DIF(CBC) + DIF(CDC) + DIF(OCDC) + LAG(BASE) 
(25) CES = TAX + AID - DGC + RESG 
(26) MAR = CCR + DDBR + STR + FDBR 
(27) GDP = GDPR*CPI 
(28) LOAN = LOANR*CPI 
(29) M2 = M2R*CPI 
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variable used for the demand functions for saving and time deposits (3) and dollar deposits 
(4) is total real monetary assets. These two assets are held mainly for their returns. 
The deposit interest rate is a significant determinant of the holding of saving and time 
deposits. This confirms that the interest rate is vary important for domestic saving 
mobilization. 
The deposit interest rate, however, is not significant in the demand functions for 
currency in circulation, demand deposits, and dollar deposits. This may be in part due to the 
small variability in the deposit interest rate. Li addition, inflation is very high. Inflation, 
therefore, dominates the opportunity costs of holding these assets. With regard to dollar 
deposit, inflation is implicitly included in the expected devaluation proxy. 
After some experimentations, the best fit for representing expected inflation for 
currency in circulation is lagged inflation, whereas for demand deposits, and saving and time 
deposits it is current inflation. One possible explanation for this is the fact that demand 
deposits and saving and time deposits are held by the more modem segment of the 
population who have various means of transforming monetary assets to others assets. They 
also have access to current information and are able to analyze it. Hence, they would be 
more able to anticipate the current inflation rate and respond accordingly. 
Foreign currency (dollar) deposits are responsive to both the foreign interest rate and 
expected devaluation. A similar result was also found by Boediono (1985). Foreign interest 
rate and expected devaluation, therefore, may serve as channels through which world 
economic disturbances affect the domestic economy. 
The money supply function is represented by equation (5). The foreign interest rate 
is used as a proxy for the opportunity cost of holding excess reserves, but was not 
significant Real gross domestic product was not significant either. Both foreign interest 
rate and real gross domestic product, then, were dropped from the equation. 
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Inflation has a negative coefficient and is significant at the 1 percent level. This may 
indicate strong government control during high inflation. As it has been shown in Chapter 
m, if there were no government credit control then the money supply might have been 
positively related to inflation. As expected, both the real monetary base and lagged 
dependent variable have positive coefficients and are significant at 1 percent level. The 
money supply function also has a very high (0.9927). 
The banks loan function is given by equation (6). All of the coefficients have the 
expected sign. Loanable funds (bank deposits and borrowing from the central bank) and 
lagged dependent variable have positive coefficients and are significant at the S percent level. 
This indicates the importance of bank deposits for bank loans. Consistent with the money 
supply function, discussed previously, inflation has a negative coefficient and is significant 
at the S percent level. That is, as inflation increases, the government tightens crcdit 
controls, hence both bank loans and the money supply fall. The loan function has a very 
high R2 (0.9896). 
Non-oil merchandise exports are given by equation (7). All of the coefficients are 
significant at 5 percent level and have the correct sign. The coefficient of determination is 
high (R2 = 0.9103). 
The export of services is modeled by equation (8). All coefficients have the correct 
sign and are significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient of determination is quite high 
(R2 = 0.9679). 
Imports of merchandise goods is represented by equation (9). The coefficient for the 
relative price of wholesale imports to the consumer price index is positive but not significant. 
A similar result was also found by Nasution (1982). Gross domestic product has a positive 
coefficient and is significant at the 1 percent level. More than 90 percent of the variation is 
explained. 
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Oil investment income transfers are shown in equation (10) in Table 9. All statistical 
properties of the equation are good. AH coefGcients have the expected sign and are 
significant at the S percent level. 
Equation (11) represents transportation and insurance payments abroad. All 
coefGcients are significant at the 5 percent level with the expected sign. The equation 
explains 99.9 percent of the data variation. 
Other import of services is represented by equation (12). Both merchandise imports 
and lagged dependent variable are significant at the 10 percent level with the correct sign. 
The coefficient of determination, R ,^ is reasonably high (0.8145). 
Private capital inflows excluding foreign direct investment are given by equation 
(13). All of the coefficients have the expected sign and are significant at the 5 percent level. 
The autocorrelation coefficient is rather high, 0.4414. The coefficient of determination is 
low, only 0.6465. Clearly, private capital inflow is difficult to model, perhaps due to the 
difficulty of finding expected devaluation and investment risk proxies. As already 
mentioned, private capital flows are very volatile. They are highly affected by speculation 
about the value of the exchange rate and foreign interest rates. 
Equation (14) is the policy reaction function to the balance of payments and domestic 
credits. The function represents the way that the government deposit at the central bank may 
be changed in response to balance of payments and other domestic credits changes. The 
fimction shows that the government sterilizes 80 percent of the balance of payments effect on 
the monetary base. This is similar to Djiwandono (1980) finding of 84 percent. The 
equation also shows that the government deposit at the central bank is partly intended to 
neutralize other domestic credit effects on the monetaiy base. The coefficients are different 
for different domestic credits. All the coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level, 
including autocorrelation. It should be also mentioned that inflation, the government budget 
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deficit, and a change in real gross domestic product were initially included in the model. All 
of them, however, were not significant, and hence were dropped. The coefficient of 
determination is reasonably high (R  ^= 0.8499). 
Equations (15) and (16) are the price linkages for merchandise imports and non-oil 
exports, respectively, to world prices. All statistics are good. Coefficients are of expected 
sign and significant at the 1 percent leveL The autocorrelation coefficient for nonoil 
merchandise export is also significant 
The investment function is given by equation (17). As can be seen, real investment 
is dependent on real banking loans and direct foreign investment This indicates that 
financing is crucial for investment This supports the hypothesis that bank loans are one of 
the most direct channels for monetary policy to affect the real sector of the economy. All 
coefficients of the investment function are significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient 
of determination is also very high (R  ^= 0.9677). 
The production function is represented by equation (18). All of the coefficient are 
significant at the 1 percent level and of expected sign. The function explained 94 percent of 
variation in real gross domestic product 
The domestic revenue function is given by equation (19). All of the coefficient are 
significant at the 1 percent level. The autocorrelation coefficient is also significant. The 
coefficient of determination is high (R  ^= 0.9466). 
The rest of the equations in Table 9 are identities or definitions. The model is 
determinant 
Di summary, the statistical properties of each of the equations in the model are 
generally good. Only one equation, the private capital inflows equation, has a rather low 
coefficient of determination. 
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Validation 
Tracking performance validation is an examination of the predictability of the model. 
In this instance, a historical simulation of the model is compared to actual data by using some 
statistical criteria. 
There are two types of simulations, static and dynamic. In static simulation the actual 
values are used for the lagged endogenous variables. In the dynamic simulation, on the 
other hand, the solution values of the model will feed the lagged endogenous variables. 
Naturally, the dynamic simulation will have larger errors than the static simulation. In 
addition to errors due to the inability of the model to predict economic events in any 
particular period, also true in static simulation, the dynamic simulation also has errors due to 
its inability to predict the lagged endogenous variables. Clearly, the errors may be 
accumulated over time. 
Various statistics have been proposed as criteria for predictive performance of an 
econometric model (Klein, 1983; Theil, 1965; 1966). Among the common ones are root 
mean square errors (RMSE), root mean square percentage errors (RMSPE), and Theil 
inequality (U). These statistics are defined as follows: 
n 
RMSE = V _L Z (Pt - At)2 
Tt=l 
(30) 
2 ((Pt-At)/At)' RMSPE = 100) (31) 
(32) U = 
70 
T = Total number of observations 
P = predicted value 
A = Actual value. 
In all of the above criteria, the smaller the value the better is the model performance. The U 
value ranges between zero and one. 
Another important measure for tracking performance is how well the model simulates 
actual turning points. Most economic time series exhibit positive serial correlation. Fora 
model to be superior to a simple time-trend model, it must predict turning points. The 
number of turning point errors (TPE), therefore, is also widely used as an indicator for 
tracking performance. 
The Theil U statistic has a fundamental shortcoming. The statistic, which is intended 
to measure prediction error is dependent on the prediction itself. It can be seen from 
equation (32) that the predicted value is in the denominator. The U statistic, therefore, can 
not be used as a criterion of comparing and ranking alternative models. To solve this 
problem, Theil (1966) proposed a modification to his earlier U statistic as 
I T / L ((Pt-At.i)-(At-At.i))2 
Ul= / h (33) 
/ Z (At-At.i)2 
V t=l 
U1 is bounded by zero, if there is a perfect forecast Its upper limit, however, is infinity. 
U1 equals 1 if the prediction value is the naive previous observation. 
For more detailed information about the sources of errors, the mean square error can 
be decomposed into three components (Pindyck and Rubinfield, 1981): 
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t=l 
(34) 
US = T(SP - S A)2/ Ï (Pt - At)2 (35) 
UC = 2T(1 - r)SP SA/Î (Ft - At)2 
t=l 
(36) 
UM + US+UC= 1 (37) 
where: FM = Mean of prediction values 
AM = Mean of actual values 
SP = Standard deviation of predicted values 
SA = Standard deviation of actual values 
r - Coefficient correlation between the actual and predicted values. 
UM is the biased proportion. It indicates systematic error of the model since it 
measures the deviation of the average prediction from the average actual value. A good 
model has a small value for UM. ff prediction is perfect then UM = 0. 
US is the variance proportion. It indicates the abiliQr of the model to replicate the 
variability of the actual values. It is desirable to have a small value for US. Since there is no 
a priori reason to insist that the two variance should be equal, US is not very meaningful 
information (Maddala, 1977). 
UC is the covariance proportion. It measures unsystematic error. This component 
of error is not worrisome. Ideally, all error is distributed to UC. 
The mean square error can also be decomposed into another set of components 
(Theil, 1966): 
T 
UR = T(SP-rSA)2/S (P-A)2 
t=l 
(38) 
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T 
UD = T(1 - r2)SA2/ L (P - A)2 (39) 
t=l 
UM + UR + UD=1 (40) 
This latter decomposition, perhaps, is more useful than the previous one since US does not 
have a meaningful interpretation. All components of the latter decomposition have a unique 
interpretation. UM is the systematic bias component, as previously discussed. UR is the 
regression component which indicates the deviation of the slope of a regression of the actual 
values on the predicted values. Clearly, if the prediction is perfect, then the slope of the 
regression (rSA/SP) will take a value of one and there will be no intercept In this instance, 
both UM and UR will vanish. Accordingly, a good model should have a small value for 
both UM and UR, and a high value for UD. UD is the residual component that captures 
unsystematic errors. 
The model is dynamically simulated over the first quarter 1977 to the first quarter 
1983 period. The model is quite stable, its average iteration is only 3.56. Validation 
statistics are given in Table 10, whereas mean square error compositions are given in Table 
11. 
As is shown in Table 9, some behavioral equations in the model are linear in the 
logarithms. Using their transformed equations directly for the simulation is biased. To 
demonstrate this, first consider the presumed true model. 
LOG(Y) = bo + bjX + a 
where: a = residual, normally distributed. 
This equation can be transformed to get a multiplicative equation 
Y = EXP(bo + biX)*U 
U = EXP(a) 
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Table 10. Validation statistics of the Indonesian monetary sector model 1977QI-1983QI 
dynamic simulation  ^
Variables RMSE RMSPE U1 U TPE 
CCR 0.703 8.066 0.077 0.039 4 
DDBR 1.475 11.78 0.124 0.064 6 
STR 0.704 8.92 0.093 0.047 6 
FDBR 0.578 12.77 0.1541 0.080 4 
M2 415.1 5.294 0.067 0.034 2 
GDPR 6.175 15.57 0.123 0.062 7 
BSrVR 1.063 12.27 0.099 0.049 6 
CPI 12.51 6.524 0.062 0.031 6 
TAX 420.5 20.74 0.174 0.088 7 
IMPD 370.1 23.49 0.177 0.090 10 
NOXPD 168.9 22.56 0.239 0.126 10 
EXSVD 37.00 38.80 0.241 0.127 3 
omD 27.55 14.11 0.100 0.050 6 
TIPD 46.39 21.10 0.166 0.084 7 
OlMSVD 77.67 35.69 0.258 0.137 8 
TPCD 165.3 1500 0.829 0.452 4 
PWNO 89.17 13.44 0.139 0.071 4 
PWIM 6.314 1.489 0.017 0.008 0 
LOANR 2.090 8.367 0.075 0.038 4 
GES 681.4 40.56 0.257 0.129 8 
M2R 2.547 9.025 0.090 0.046 7 
^Variable name de&iitions are given in Appendix I, 
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U is lognormally distributed. 
The mean of Y is: 
E(Y) =EXP(bo + biX)E(U) 
= EXP(bo + biX + l/2a2) 
Clearly, a transformed equation like Y = EXPQOQ + bjX), is biased. Accordingly, all 
loglinear equations used in the simulation are transformed following: 
Y = eXP+l/2MSE 
where: MSB = Mean square errors of the estimated function 
Most variables have a low RMSPE. Out of 21 variables presented in Table 10, only 
4 variables have an RMSPE higher than 25 percent—namely, TPCD, GES, EXSVD, and 
OIMSVD. These four variables also have the highest U1 and U values. These variables are 
very volatile. Clearly, they are very difficult to model. Most of the errors, however, are 
unsystematic (Table 11). Table 11 shows that all of the four variables have a UM of less 
than 0.1. Their UR and US are lower than 0.2. 
None of the variables has a U1 higher than one. Only 5 variables have a U1 higher 
than 0.2, namely, TPCD, GES, EXSVD, OIMSVD, and NOXPD. 
U is very low for most variables. It is less than 0.1, except for TPCD, GES, 
EXSVD, OIMSVD. 
The turning points errors are reasonable in number. There are only four variables 
with more than 7 (28 percent) turning points error: IMPD, NOXPD, OIMSVD, and GES. 
IMPD and NOXPD, however, have very good performances judged by other criteria. 
Error composition shows that almost none of the endogenous variables suffer from 
systematic error. AH variables except M2 have a UM of less than 0.2, UR is also always 
less than 0.2 except for M2 and GDPR. GDPR, however, has a very low US, which is 
0.058. Among all variables, only M2 and EXSVD have a US higher than 0.15. M2, 
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Table 11. Mean square errors decomposition proportions  ^
Variables UM UR UD US UC 
CCR 0.047 0.181 0-772 0.048 0.905 
DDBR 0.169 0.028 0.803 0.110 0.721 
STR 0.065 0.057 0.878 0.005 0.930 
FDBR 0.060 0.050 0.890 0.137 0.803 
M2 0.390 0.380 0.229 0.404 0.205 
GDPR 0.012 0.239 0.749 0.058 0.930 
BSrVR 0.002 0.062 0.936 0.001 0.997 
CPI 0.002 0.003 0.995 0.007 0.991 
TAX 0.011 0.000 0.989 0.039 0.950 
IMPD 0.015 0.014 0.971 0.008 0.977 
NOXPD 0.167 0.040 0.793 0.016 0.817 
EXSVD 0.009 0.174 0.817 0.331 0.661 
omD 0.002 0.195 0.802 0.123 0.875 
TIPD 0.020 0.015 0.965 0.007 0.973 
OIMSVD 0.094 0.013 0.892 0.147 0.759 
TFCD 0.004 0.084 0.913 0.037 0.959 
PWNO 0.133 0.183 0.683 0.074 0.792 
PWIM 0.009 0.002 0.988 0.000 0.990 
LOANR 0.059 0.036 0.905 0.002 0.939 
M2R 0.139 0.003 0.858 0.019 0.845 
GES 0.005 0.067 0.928 0.000 0.995 
^Variable name definitions are given in Appendix I. 
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however, has a very low RMSPE, Ul, U, and TPE. EXSVD has a good performance based 
on TPE, U, and Ul criteria. 
The stability of the model is tested by its abili  ^to converge from various initial 
periods and its response to a one-period exogenous shock. If the model is stable, initial 
period changes would not significantly affect the convergeability of the model. If the 
fluctuation response to a one-period exogenous shock is decreasing as time passes, then the 
model is stable. 
The model is simulated using the first quarter of 1979 and 1980 as initial points. The 
first simulation converges with 3.06 average iterations whereas the second one converges 
with 3.54 average iterations. As already mentioned, simulation using the whole data set 
(starting &om the first quarter of 1977) converges with 3.56 average iterations. Clearly, the 
model is stable based on the different initial values convergeability criterion. 
The exogenous variable shock test is conducted by the increasing exchange rate in the 
first quarter of 1980 by 20 percent. The percentage change in selected endogenous variables 
as the result of the exchange rate shock is given in Table 12. It can be seen that the impacts 
of the shock are damped over time. The model, therefore, is stable. 
Overall, the model's performance is satisfactory. The relationships among all 
variables are consistent with prior economic expectation. The tracking performance is also 
good. More importantly, the model tracks the key variables, such as GDPR, CPI, INVR, 
NOXPD, IMPD, LOANR, FER, and M2, well. The model is also stable. 
Table 12. Impacts of 20 percent increase in exchange rate in the first quarter of 1980 
(percent change)  ^
Quarter GDPR IMPD NOXPD CPI FER 
1980 (1) -0.0424 -1.3618 27.8846 2.5008 12.1230 
(2) 1.2153 5.6196 5.0917 3.5810 3.8315 
(3) 0.1982 2.7930 0.2747 2.2294 2.3363 
(4) -0.4877 -0.2741 1.0454 0.0788 4.2262 
1981 (1) 0.0450 -1.4158 2.8198 -1.5131 5.4188 
(2) -0.5837 -1.8158 1.9275 -1.2438 6.3134 
(3) 1.4718 2.1209 -0.3914 0.4102 3.6743 
(4) 0.6607 2.6682 -2.6369 1.9108 1.2688 
1982 (1) 0.1316 2.0336 -2.6837 1.8975 -1.0314 
(2) -0.1399 0.0255 -0.2754 0.1810 -0.9450 
(3) -2.2265 -2.9410 0.4043 -0.4377 1.1376 
(4) -0.0798 -0.5800 0.7244 -0.4997 1.4754 
1983 (1) 0.0484 0.2752 -0.3178 0.2223 0.8677 
^Variable name definitions are given in Appendix I. 
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CHAPTER V. POLICY SIMULATIONS 
As mentioned earlier, one of the objectives in constructing an econometric model is to 
provide a tool for policy analysis. The magnitude and time path of the response of 
endogenous variables to changes in alternatives policy instruments can be predicted using the 
model. 
The Indonesian monetary sector model, which was estimated in Chapter IV, will be 
used to analyze two alternative policies: 
Case I. The central bank's unsterilized credit to commercial banks is increased by 
20 percent Unsterilized credit means that the increase is not accompanied 
by an increase in the government deposit at the central bank. This is an 
easy credit policy. 
Case n. The exchange rate is increased by 20 percent from the historically observed 
values. This represents a once-for-all devaluation policy. 
The impacts of Cases I and n on some key variables, namely GDPR, CPI, FER, 
INVR, NOXPD, IMPD, LOANR, and M2, will be evaluated in terms of elasticities. That 
is, the ratio of percentage change in the endogenous variable and the percentage change in the 
policy instruments will be examined. 
The impact elasticities of central bank credit to commercial banks are presented in Table 13. 
Clearly, this policy has expansionary effects on the money supply and commercial bank 
loans. The average elasticities for commercial bank loans and the money supply are 0.2666 
and 0.1817, respectively. As commercial bank loans increase, real investment, and hence 
real gross domestic product, will increase. The average elasticities for real investment and 
gross domestic product are 0.1105 and 0.0786, respectively. This finding confirms the 
importance of credit for capital formation and economic growth. 
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Table 13. Impact elasticities of 20 percent increase in CBC (Case I)  ^
Quarter GDPR CPI INVR LOAN FER NOXPD IMPD M2 
1977 1 0.0168 0.1396 0.0161 0.0162 -0.4364 -0.1950 0.1571 0.0323 
2 0.0007 0.2252 0.0075 0.0353 -0.7106 -0.3109 0.2226 0.0001 
3 0.2541 0.2342 0.2157 0.0735 -1.5331 -0.2983 0.5335 0.0486 
4-0.0022 0.1847 0.0185 0.1041 -1.3867 -0.2578 0.1794 0.0667 
1978 1 0.0586 0.1117 0.0708 0.1245 -2.5082 -0.1525 0.1781 0.1056 
2 0.0349 0.0852 0.0861 0.1591 -1.7413 -0.1181 0.1242 0.1415 
3 0.0432 0.0990 0.0688 0.1790 -13.1865 -0.1365 0.1476 0.1537 
4 0.0764 0.1069 0.0938 0.1980 -1.6489 -0.1442 0.1940 0.1506 
1979 1 0.0328 0.1095 0.0581 0.2139 -2.2216 -0.1521 0.1460 0.1444 
2 0.2907 0.0599 0.2673 0.2460 -1.7850 -0.0567 0.3942 0.1801 
3 0.0323 0.0632 0.0718 0.2613 -1.9107 -0.0874 0.0994 0.1915 
4 0.0421 0.0964 0.0789 0.2700 -1.7546 -0.1330 0.1438 0.1813 
19801 0.0801 0.1609 0.1183 0.2918 -1.6061 -0.2176 0.2524 0.1794 
2 0.0637 0.2190 0.1061 0.3136 -1.4265 -0.2967 0.2912 0.1703 
3 0.0843 0.2085 0.1264 0.3281 -1.3545 -0.2808 0.3051 0.1679 
4 0.0383 0.1600 0.0880 0.3361 -1.7878 -0.2206 0.2025 0.1835 
1981 1 0.0140 0.1318 0.0671 0.3363 -1.9448 -0.1847 0.1462 0.2033 
2 0.0638 0.1445 0.1162 0.3397 -1.8657 -0.1970 0.2169 0.2184 
3 0.1855 0.1581 0.2183 0.3611 -1.7788 -0.2035 0.3734 0.2370 
4 0.0718 0.2243 0.1332 0.3944 -2.2171 -0.3029 0.3061 0.2384 
19821 0.0502 0.3475 0.1221 0.4398 -2.9674 -0.4619 0.4032 0.2323 
2 0.1717 0.5712 0.2450 0.5405 -4.8942 -0.7143 0.7797 0.2932 
3 0.2920 0.2580 0.2861 0.4221 -3.9205 -0.3257 0.6039 0.2665 
4-0.0735 -0.0941 -0.0233 0.2952 -3.3182 0.1323 -0.1745 0.3237 
1983 1 0.0425 0.0126 0.1062 0.3854 -2.9892 -0.138 0.0608 0.4318 
Avg. 0.0786 0.1607 0.1105 0.2666 -2.5158 -0.2132 0.2515 0.1817 
®See Appendix I for variable defînitions. 
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This easy credit policy, however, also has negative effects. It increases inflation and 
creates balance of payments problems. As can be seen from Table 13, the average impact 
elasticity for price (CPI) is 0.1607. Perhaps the most serious impact is the effect on the 
balance of payments. The average impact elasticity for the central bank's foreign exchange 
reserve (FER) is very small (large in absolute value). It is-2.5158. Non-oil merchandise 
exports have a negative average elasticity, whereas merchandise imports have a positive 
average elasticity. All of these results are consistent with the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments predictions (Frenkel and Johnson, 1976). 
The impacts of a 20 percent sustained devaluation (Case II) are given in Table 14. 
As expected, devaluation increases the central bank's foreign exchange reserves. This is 
mainly due to the increase in exports. The average impact elasticity for non-oil merchandise 
export is very high at 1.9702. Although merchandise imports are also increasing, their 
average elasticity is only 0.2310. Since the elasticity is less than one, the dollar value of the 
merchandise imports is actually decreasing. 
The common problem with devaluation is its inflationary effects. As can be seen 
from Table 14 the impact elasticity of devaluation on the price level is quite high. The 
average impact elasticity is 0.3340. The inflation rate, however, is less than the devaluation 
rate. 
Of interest is the effect of devaluation on real investment and gross domestic product. 
Table 14 shows that devaluation has contractionary effects on real investment and gross 
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Table 14. Impact elasticities of 20 percent increase in EXC (Case 11)  ^
Quarter GDPR CPI DSrVR LOAN FER NOXPD IMPD M2 
1977 1 -0.2386 0.0799 -0.1980 -0.0965 1.2381 1.4734 -0.1420 -0.0285 
2-0.6131 0.2716 -0.4923 -0.3177 1.7574 1.7179 -0.3800 -0.1251 
3-0.0576 0.3587 -0.0722 -0.4014 1.9591 1.8764 -0.3949 -0.1381 
4-0.1873 0.3760 -0.1812 -0.4171 1.9725 1.9079 -0.2620 -0.1168 
1978 1 -0.0685 0.3511 -0.0833 -0.3860 3.1322 2.0020 -0.3911 -0.0539 
2 0.0614 0.2158 -0.0327 -0.2864 2.4687 2.2990 0.4178 0.0252 
3 0.0729 0.1642 -0.0912 -0,2186 17.9416 2.3884 0.2057 0.1059 
4-0.3845 0.2646 -0.3435 -0.3123 2.8202 2.1358 -0.0728 0.0840 
1979 1 -0.0981 0.3690 -0.1219 -0.4013 3.4974 1.9791 0.3793 0.0656 
2-0.1639 0.4201 -0.1960 -0.4677 2.7214 1.8737 0.3475 0.0477 
3-0.0568 0.4197 -0.1118 -0.4478 2.8420 1.8890 0.4706 0.0745 
4-0.1132 0.4227 -0.1425 -0.4107 2.4830 1.8717 0.4140 0.1155 
1980 1 -0.1091 0.4141 -0.0935 -0.3893 2.0130 1.8930 0.4109 0.1462 
2-0.1237 0.4194 -0.1532 -0.3787 1.6257 1.8811 0.3977 0.1723 
3-0.1058 0.3842 -0.1493 -0.3620 1.4429 1.9495 0.3856 0.1845 
4-0.0840 0.3330 -0.1363 -0.3084 1.8102 1.7893 0.3620 0.2079 
1981 1 -0.0865 0.3315 -0.1308 -0.2902 1.8688 2.0527 0.3575 0.2300 
2-0.0879 0.4094 -0.1275 -0.3159 1.7029 1.9049 0.4329 0.2409 
3-0.0093 0.3804 -0=874 -0.2979 1.4512 1.9708 0.5024 0.2313 
4-0.0715 0.3027 -0.1329 -0.2426 1.6482 2.1108 0.3475 0.2440 
1982 1 -0.0719 0.2556 -0.1291 -0.1978 1.8906 2.2040 0.3001 0.2653 
2-0.1019 0.3552 -0.1327 -0.2233 2.5957 2.0049 0.3618 0.2979 
3 0.0229 0.4006 -0.0527 -0.2453 1.9732 1.9375 0.5634 0.2714 
4-0.0643 0.3758 -0.1091 -0.2326 1.8316 1.9714 0.4292 0.2560 
1983 1 -0.0618 0.2754 -0.1195 -0.1750 1.6170 2.1661 0.3323 0.2654 
Avg. -0.1183 0.3340 -0.1448 -0.3037 2.7322 1.9702 0.2310 0.1228 
®See Appendix I for variable definitions. 
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domestic product This may be explained by the reduction in commercial bank loans. The 
average impact elastici  ^for real commercial bank loans is -0.3031. This is even less than 
the average impact elasticity of the price level. Hence, even nominal loans are decreasing. 
Commercial bank loans decrease because bank deposits decrease due to inflation. In 
addition, the government will also tighten credit controls during a high inflation. 
This finding shows that devaluation could lead to stagflation (output stagnation and 
high inflation). A similar result was found by Boediono (1979). Nasution (1982), 
however, found that devaluation increases real gross domestic product. Nasution finding is 
obvious 6om his real income specification, which is a direct function of purchasing power 
parity. If the impact elasticity of the price level is less than one, then devaluation will 
increase real gross domestic product There is no consideration on the role of commercial 
bank loans on investment 
The evidence of the stagflationary effect of devaluation is not uncommon for 
developing countries (Alejandro, 1963; Cooper, 1971). Theoretical analysis of this 
phenomenon can be found in Alejandro (1963), Krfigman and Taylor (1978), and Buffie 
(1984). The stagflationary impacts of devaluation may partly explain the government's 
strong persistent in maintaining an overvalued exchange rate. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
The main objective of this study has been to develop a monetary policy oriented 
model for Indonesia. As background, a brief survey on the development of economic 
modeling in developing countries in general and in Indonesia in particular was undertaken. 
A qualitative description of Indonesian financial institutions and policies was also provided. 
It was found that none of the previous models of the Didonesian economy considered the 
role of financing availability, particularly bank loans, on investment It was argued here that 
the bank loan-investment nexus may be the most direct channel for monetary policies to 
affect the real sector. All previous models of the Indonesian economy also neglect the 
government's attempt to sterilize the balance of payments and other domestic credits effects 
on the money supply. In addition, private capital flows and trade in services are treated as 
exogenous in all previous models. 
This study constructs a monetary policy oriented model which includes commercial, 
bank loans determination, the role of financial availability for investment, the government's 
sterilization reaction function, private capital inflows, and trade in services. Monetary assets 
are decomposed into four components: currency in circulation, demand deposits at 
commercial banks, saving and time deposits, and foreign currency deposits. This 
disaggregation is crucial because each asset behaves differently and bank deposits are linked 
to commercial bank loans. A money-supply function which provides a linkage between the 
money stock and the balance of payments through the monetary base is also derived. The 
government's credit control is incorporated into the model through inflation. That is, credit 
restriction is assumed to be positively related to inflation. 
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The model's coefficients ate estimated using data from 1976 quarter one to 1983 
quarter one. The non-linear three stage least squares method is used for the estimation. Due 
to the limited number of observations, lagged dependent variables are not included in the 
instrument variables. The estimated behavioral equations have acceptable statistical 
properties. The estimated directional relationships are in accord with theoretical 
expectations. Validation of the model through historical simulation provided a satisfactory 
performance of the modeL If tracks the data well. It is also stable. Some important 
conclusions drawn from the empirical results are discussed below. 
First, saving and time deposit respond significantly to their interest payments. This 
confirms the importance of the interest rate for domestic saving mobilization. The deposit 
rate, however, is not significant in other monetary assets demand functions. This may be 
due to the relatively low and stable deposit rate compared to inflation. Inflation, therefore, 
dominates the opportunity costs of the assets. This study also shows that foreign currency 
deposits are signiHcantly responsive to both the foreign interest rate and expected 
devaluation. This indicates that the Didonesian monetary sector is vulnerable to world 
financial disturbances. 
Second, investment is, indeed, dependent on financial availability. This confirms the 
important role of commercial bank loans for economic growth. The bank loan-investment 
nexus, therefore, is one of the most important channels for monetary policies to affect real 
activities. 
Third, there is strong evidence that the government sterilizes the balance of payment 
and other central bank domestic credits using the government deposit at the central bank. 
About 80 percent of the balance of payments is sterilized. The sterilized portions of the 
central bank credit to commercial banks and to the private sector are about 80 and 67 percent, 
respectively. 
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Fourth, non-direct private investment capital flows are significantly responsive to 
both expexned devaluation and the foreign interest rate. Both have a negative sign. Again, 
this indicates a vulnerability of the Indonesian monetary sector to both domestic and foreign 
financial disturbances. A more flexible exchange rate after the financial liberalization policy 
could lead to a higher and more unstable capital flows. 
One of the objectives of building the econometric model is for policy analysis. In 
this study, two alternatives policies are simulated using the model: (1) an unsterilized 20 
percent increase in central bank credit to commercial banks; and (2) a 20 percent devaluation. 
Some important results of the simulation exercises are summarized below. 
First, domestic credit expansion could increase real gross domestic product and 
investment. Inflation, however, could also increase as well. This may also indicate that the 
government's credit controls were successful in controlling inflation. Anotha- important 
problem of the easy credit policy is that it causes a deterioration in the balance of payments as 
predicted by the monetarist approach. 
Second, devaluation may reduce real economic activities. This is in contrary to the 
general view that devaluation increases real income (Nasution, 1983). The stagnation effect 
of devaluation, however, is not uncommon in developing countries (Alejandro, 1963; 
Cooper, 1971; Krugman and Taylor, 1978; Buffie, 1984), This finding, at least, serves as a 
warning for too high expectations from a devaluation. Devaluation is inflationary. The 
advantage of devaluation is that it might improve the balance of payments problem. Clearly, 
however, devaluation is a costly cure for this problem. 
The model developed in this study can be used to evaluate some other policies such 
as deposit interest changes, and abandoning a sterilization effort Certain extensions of the 
model could improve the performance of the model and allow additional policy analyses. 
Some of the interesting extensions are as follows; 
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(1) to consider the role of financial availability on working capital or capacity 
utilization. This is another important channel for monetary policies to affect 
real output 
(2) to disaggregate production according to sectoral origins. Of particular interest 
is the separation of the agricultural sector, since it is the largest sector in the 
economy. 
(3) to link the model with another sectoral model. As an example, linking the 
model with another agricultural sectoral or crop model would provide a very 
interesting analysis on the transmission of monetary policies to the agricultural 
sector and vice-versa. 
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APPENDIX I. VARIABLE NAMES AND DEFINITIONS 
Variables with an asterisk (*) are exogenous. All vsdues are in billions of rupiahs unless 
otherwise indicated. 
ADD* = Government foreign borrowing 
BASE = Monetary base 
BGD* = Government deposit at commercial banks 
BOP = Balance of payments 
CBC* = Central bank advances to commercial banks 
CCR = Real currency in circulation (billion) 
CDC* = Central bank direct credit 
CPI = Consumer price index (1975=100) 
CPIW* = Trade weighted foreign consumer price index (1975=100) 
D = Dummy variable for managed peg regime starting from 4^^* quarter of 1978 
DDBR = Real demand dqwsits with commercial banks (billion) 
DGC = Change in the government deposit at the central bank 
DRN* = Weighted average of annual deposit rate (%/year) 
EDE = Expected devaluation (%) 
EXC* = Exchange rale (Rp/$) 
EXSVD = Export of services 
FDBR = Real dollar deposits with commercial banks (billion) 
FDID* = Foreign direct investment 
FNP = Lidustrial production index of the OECD countries (1975=100) 
GDP = Nominal gross domestic product 
GDPR = Real gross domestic product (billion) 
GES = Government expenditures 
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IFA = Inflation rate (%) 
IFE = Expected inflation (%) 
IMPD = Merchandise exports 
INVR = Real investment (billion) 
KFS = Real capital stock (billion) 
LIB* = London eurodollar deposit rate (%/year) 
LOAN = Conmiercial bank loan to private sector 
LOANR = Real loans (billion) 
LTSLR* = Real total stock of foreign liabilities of the private sector (accumulated RPCR in 
the previous period 
MAR = Real monetary assets of the private sector (billion) 
M2R = Real broad money (billion) 
NOXPD = Non-oil merchandise exports 
OCDC* = Other central bank domestic credit 
OmD = Oil investment income transfers abroad 
OIMS VD = Other imports of services 
OXPD* = Oil exports 
PWIM = Wholesale price index of imported goods (1971=100) 
PWNO = Wholesale price index of exported goods (1971=100) 
RESB* = Residual of the balance of payments identity 
STR = Real saving and time deposits (billion) 
SI*, S2*, S3* = Seasonal dummies for quarter one, two, and three, respectively 
TAX = Government non-aid revenue 
TEPD = Transportation and merchandise insurance payment 
TPCR = Real private capital inflow (billion) 
97 
APPENDIX n. DATA SOURCES AND TRANSFORMATION 
Sources and the correspondent data obtained from are as follows: 
(1) Indonesian Financial Statistics, Bank Indonesia, Jakarta: Monetary variables, 
domestic interest rate, and oil investment income transfer. 
(2) International Financial Statistics, Ditemational Monetary Fund, Washington, 
DC: Price indexes, London eurodollar deposit rate, government expenditure, 
government revenue, investment, gross domestic product, and exchange rate. 
(3) Balance of Payment Statistics, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC: 
Balance of payment components 
(4) OECD Main Economic Indicators, OECD, Paris: OECD industrial production 
index. 
(5) Indikator Ekonomi, Biro Pusat Statisdk, Jakarta: wholesale price indexes of 
imported and exported goods, and capital imported goods. 
Gross domestic product (GDP) and investment (INV) data are only available in 
annual series. The annual series is converted to quarterly series by some estimation 
technique, with a condition that their total value in a given year matches the corresponding 
value of the annual series. This technique has been widely used (Aghevli* 1977; Boediono, 
1979; Djiwandono, 1980; Nasution, 1982). 
The annual GDP is fit with annual data of some explanatory variables which values 
are also available in quarterly. The best fit is 
GDP = 3108 + 1.6050GES + 1.5107EXPT + 0.9347 IMPT 
(3.975) (3.132) (3.889) (1.753) = 0.996 
where: GDP = gross domestic product (billion Rp) 
GES = Government expenditure (billion Rp) 
EXPT = Total export (billion Rp) 
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IMPT = Total import (billion Rp) 
This equation is used to get unadjusted estimate values of quarterly GDP by assigning the 
quarterly values to the explanatory variables. The estimates are, then, adjusted to make their 
total value for one year equal the actual value in that year. 
The first estimate quarterly data are refitted again with the same independent variables 
as the annual equation. The estimated value is, then, readjusted. This process is repeated 
until the best fit, highest R2, is found. In this study, the best fi^t is found after the second 
interaction. The equation used to estimate quarterly GDP is: 
GDP = 783.950 + 1.4933 GES + 1.47664 EXPT + 1.1550 IMPT 
(8.291) (16.291) (13.277) (6.827) R2 = 0.995 
The annual data for investment are converted to quarterly using the same procedure 
as GDP data are. The annual investment equation is: 
INV = -277.027 + 0.1709 GDP + 0.7407 NIK 
(-1.942) (9.531) (3.718) R  ^= 0.997 
where: INV = Investment (bUlion Rp) 
NIK = Capital imported good (billion Rp) 
The best quarterly equation is found after the first interaction. The equation is: 
INV = -57.3701 + 0.1740 GDP + 0.6816 NIK . 
(-2.262) (44.027) (16.367) R  ^= 0.994 
